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CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility
John Copeland Nagle*
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") 1 and causation have
enjoyed an uneasy coexistence. The tension between them re-
sults from the circumstances in which CERCLA became law.
The Congress that enacted CERCLA considered two alternative
liability schemes, both of which required that "polluters pay" for
the cleanup of hazardous wastes.2 The House proposed impos-
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the Department of Justice. I am most thankful for the persistent encourage-
ment of my wife Lisa. The views here are my own, and do not necessarily repre-
sent the position of the Department of Justice.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 and Supp. 1m, 1991); see also Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(amending CERCLA). The statute is also known as the "Superfumd" act be-
cause of the fund it created to pay for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. See
CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611.
2. As EPA Administrator Carol Browner recently stated, "Superfund was
structured on the principle that polluters should pay for cleanup." Proposals to
Reauthorize the Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trans-
portation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (statement of EPA Administrator Carol Browner on
Feb. 3, 1994) [hereinafter Browner Statement], available in LEXIS, LEGIS Li-
brary, CNGTST File; see also S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980)
(stating that the goal of the Senate bill was "assuring that those who caused
chemical harm bear the costs of that harm"), reprinted in 1 U.S. SENATE COMNI.
ON ENV'T & PuBuc WoRxs, A LEGISLATrIVE HISTORY OF THE COM[PREHENSIVE
ENvTL. RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LisAriT AcT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND),
PUBLIC LAW 96-510, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1983) [hereinafter CERCLA LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY]; 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 64 (stating that
the goal of the House bill was to recover the costs of hazardous wastes cleanups
from the persons responsible for the problem). For a few of the many subse-
quent judicial expressions of this principle, see, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Mur-
tha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Acete Agric. Chems.
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bliss, 667 F.
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ing liability on those who "caused or contributed" to hazardous
waste problems, 3 while the Senate looked to specifically desig-
nated "responsible parties."4 The Senate prevailed.5 The conse-
quences of that choice for the traditional tort concept of
causation, like many other questions left unanswered in the
last-minute rush to enact CERCLA,6 remained for the courts to
discern.
The ensuing litigation produced a nearly unbroken line of
decisions holding that establishing a defendant as a "responsible
party" does not require proof of causation.7 Instead, causation
serves as a factor in the three statutory defenses, in apportion-
ing liability, and in allocating liability among responsible par-
ties.8 Yet the consensus supporting this reading of CERCLA
masks discomfort with the result. Interpreting CERCLA as pre-
cluding the need to establish causation 9 presents heightened
concerns when courts read CERCLA as imposing joint and sev-
eral liability' ° on responsible parties." The criticism has in-
creased as Congress once again struggles to amend the
statute, 12 especially given Congress's failure to make any funda-
Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288
(D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
3. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1980) (adding Safe Drinking
Water Act § 3071(a)(1)), reprinted in 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 391, 438.
4. S. 1480,96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEG-
ISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 462, 485-88; see infra note 63 (listing respon-
sible parties).
5. See infra note 63; see also infra part II.A (defining responsible parties).
6. For a description of the process by which a lame-duck Congress enacted
CERCLA in December 1980 after the election of President Reagan, see Frank P.
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980,8 COLUM. J. ENWTL. L. 1,
1-2 (1982).
7. See infra part II.A.
8. See infra part H.C-D, III.B.2.
9. See infra part ll.C.
10. Joint and several liability permits a plaintiff to recover all of its dam-
ages from any defendant. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND IEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 47, at 328-30 (5th ed. 1984).
11. See infra note 103.
12. As Representative Swift said in introducing the Clinton Administra-
tion's CERCLA reform bill, see infra note 26, "Superfund is the program every-
one loves to hate." 140 CONG. REC. H283 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1994). The criticisms
identified by the EPA include inconsistent standards for cleanup, high transac-
tions costs, perceived unfairness in the liability scheme, the confused relation-
ship between federal and state authorities, inadequate community
involvement, and impediments to economic redevelopment. Browner State-
ment, supra note 2; see also 139 CONG. REC. E3041 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993)
("Superfund cleanup costs too much, take too long and often impose unjust and
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mental changes to the statute's liability scheme when last
amended in 1986.13
Two recent CERCLA cases involving the Alcan Aluminum
Company exemplify the courts' frustration, but also suggest a
solution. In both cases,14 the Second and Third Circuits agreed
that the plaintiff' 5 need not prove causation to establish the
disproportionate costs on potentially responsible parties.") (statement of Rep.
Upton). Many have singled out the liability scheme-the focus of this Article-
for particular scorn. In the standard case:
EPA typically orders the larger polluters to clean up a site. They in
turn sue smaller polluters, and their insurance companies, to recover
some of the costs. In the end, the courts determine everyone's share.
This liability system has become a cash cow for lawyers and has forced
EPA and industry to spend more time and money finding culprits than
cleaning up contaminated sites.
140 CONG. REC. S1059 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen. Baucus). The
critics also target the retroactive nature of CERCLA liability for actions which,
taken decades ago, satisfied contemporary standards. See, e.g., Superfund Lia-
bility Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous
Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
[hereinafter Superfund Liability Hearings] (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F.
Chavis, Jr. on Feb. 10, 1994), available in LEXIS, LEGIS Library, CNGTST
File.
13. In 1986, SARA modified CERCLA's liability scheme by providing re-
sponsible parties with a right of contribution, CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f), and by creating an "innocent landowner" defense to liability, CER-
CLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35). SARA also added provisions to encourage
the settlement of CERCLA cases and to define the CERCLA liability of federal
facilities. See generally Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spread-
ing the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VA-D. L. REv. 1469, 1471-72 (1989) (list-
ing SARA's contributions to CERCLA).
14. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992). Because
the case names are identical, the decisions will be abbreviated as Alcan (2d
Cir.) and Alcan (3d Cir.) respectively. Commentary on the decisions includes
Michael A. Brown, U.S. v. Alcan: A Crack in the Wall of Joint and Several
Liability, 24 CHEM. WASTE LrrIG. REP. 306 (1992); David M. Moore, The Divisi-
bility of Harm Defense to Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA, 23
EmrL. L. REP. 10,529 (1993); Linda L. Rockwood & James L. Harrison, The
"Alcan" Decisions: Causation Through the Back Door, 23 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,542
(1993); Michael Noone, Note, Environmental Law-Third Circuit Reexamines
Divisibility Under CERCLA-United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1993), 66 TEmPLE L. REV. 307 (1993); Evan B. Westerfield,
When Less is More: A Significant Risk Threshold for CERCLA Liability, 60 U.
CHI. L. REv. 697 (1993); B. Todd Wetzel, Note, Divisibility of Harm Under CER-
CLA: Does an Indivisible Potential or Averted Harm Warrant the Imposition of
Joint and Several Liability?, 81 Ky. L. J. 825, 844-46 (1992-93).
15. The federal government was the plaintiff in both Alcan cases. Alcan
(2d Cir.), 990 F.2d 711; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d 252. CERCLA also permits
private parties to sue responsible parties to clean up contaminated property.
The same standards apply in many instances, but sometimes government plain-
tiffs face a different burden than private plaintiffs. Compare CERCLA
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company as a "responsible party."16 Yet both courts added that
Alcan could avoid joint and several liability by introducing evi-
dence that the courts should apportion the harm attributable to
the company.17 Further, the Alcan courts described scenarios in
which a party may rely upon an absence of causation to escape
all liability under CERCLA.18 Causation thus reappeared
"through the backdoor."' 9
The Alcan decisions offer a new way of thinking about how
causation should relate to the "responsible party" liability
scheme employed by CERCLA. Causation is a necessary prereq-
uisite for assigning responsibility in tort law, even in strict lia-
bility regimes.2 0 Nonetheless, courts have excused the victims21
of hazardous waste injuries from proving causation under CER-
CLA because of the well-noted difficulties in determining the
cause of injuries from hazardous substances. 22 The Alcan deci-
sions offer a different, although not inconsistent, perspective by
allowing a defendant to establish that it did not cause all or part
of the plaintiffs injury, thereby avoiding responsibility for the
part of the injury that it did not cause. Parts of CERCLA al-
ready reflect this approach,23 but because other parts of the
statute conflict with it,24 Congress should amend the statute in
several respects.
This Article considers the relationship between causation
and responsibility in CERCLA. Part I describes what might
have occurred if Congress had enacted the House version, which
would have imposed liability on those who "caused or contrib-
uted" to hazardous waste contamination. This hypothetical dis-
§ 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (allowing government reimbursement
for response costs that are "not inconsistent" with the National Contingency
Plan (NCP)) with CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (permitting
private parties reimbursement for response costs that are "consistent" with the
NCP).
16. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F. 2d at 721; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 266; see
also infra note 63 (listing responsible parties); part H.A (defining responsible
parties).
17. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F. 2d at 722; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 270; see
also infra part I.C (defining apportionment).
18. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 270.
19. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722.
20. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
21. The "victims" include both the owners of property contaminated by haz-
ardous wastes and the EPA acting on behalf of the general public, either of
which may bring a CERCLA action to recover costs spent to clean up hazardous
substances. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j).
22. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
23. See infra part II.D.
24. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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cussion permits a brief survey of the literature addressing the
place of causation in common law tort litigation involving haz-
ardous substances. Part II analyzes the responsible party
scheme that Congress actually adopted and describes how the
courts have struggled to frame a coherent liability scheme from
the often incomplete statutory language. Part III argues that
because responsibility should not attach when a party disproves
causation, the existing CERCLA framework is overinclusive and
does not accomplish its stated goal of imposing liability on "re-
sponsible parties."
This Article concludes by proposing three amendments to
the CERCLA liability provisions to assure that a defendant who
can show that it did not cause the plaintiffs injury will avoid
responsibility for that injury. These amendments would elimi-
nate from the liability scheme current owners and operators
with no connection to the site at the time of the disposal of haz-
ardous substances, would establish proof of the absence of cau-
sation as an absolute defense to liability, and would provide an
early opportunity to apportion or allocate 25 liability among re-
sponsible parties, primarily based on the amount of the injury
attributable to each party. These proposals, represented in part
in proposed legislation to reform CERCLA,26 would make the
statute's liability scheme better serve its original purpose of im-
posing responsibility for cleanup costs on the parties that actu-
ally caused the contamination.
I. THE CAUSATION MODEL
First, what might have been. The House's proposed bill im-
posed liability on persons who "caused or contributed to the re-
25. See infra part H.C-D.
26. The Clinton Administration introduced its proposed "Superfund Re-
form Act of 1994" in February 1994. See S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994);
H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). In addition to amending CERCLA's
liability provisions, see infra notes 183, 184, 200, 201, 207, 212-217 and accom-
panying text, the bill would require further community participation in cleanup
decisions, S. 1834, supra, § 101, would facilitate voluntary response actions, id.
§ 128, would develop national cleanup standards, id. § 501, and would create an
Environmental Insurance Resolution Fund to reduce litigation between respon-
sible parties, id. § 802. The Administration's proposal is summarized at 140
CONG. REC. S1077-85 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994). For an overview of an alternative
bill introduced by Representative Boucher, see 139 CONG. REC. E3118-20 (daily
ed. Nov. 24, 1993).
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lease or threatened release" of hazardous substances. 27 As one
committee report explained:
The Committee intends that the usual common law principles of causa-
tion, including those of proximate causation, should govern the deter-
mination of whether a defendant "caused or contributed" to a release or
threatened release .... Thus, for instance, the mere act of generation
or transportation of hazardous waste, or the mere existence of a gener-
ator's or transporter's waste in a site with respect to which cleanup
costs are incurred would not, in and of itself, result in liability under
section 3071. The Committee intends that for liability to attach under
this section, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal or contributory
nexus between the acts of the defendant and the conditions which ne-
cessitated response action under section 3041.28
Similarly, then-Representative Gore repeatedly stressed that
the bill required proof of causation.29
Had Congress adopted the House's approach to causation,
common-law principles of causation would have formed the ba-
sis for determining liability under CERCLA.30 Under tradi-
tional tort causation principles, an injured party must
demonstrate that a defendant's actions were both the cause in
fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.3 1 Gener-
ally, to establish cause in fact, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant's actions constituted "a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm"3 2 or that the harm would not have occurred
27. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a)(D) (1980), reprinted in 2
CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 438. The House passed H.R.
7020 in September 1980. See 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
391.
28. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 33-34 (1980), re-
printed in 2 CERCLA LEGIsLATIrvE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 64-65; see also 2
CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 357 (statement of Rep. Madi-
gan) (quoting committee report).
29. See 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 359-61 (state-
ments of Rep. Gore).
30. These principles have been the subject of recent academic commentary,
much of it addressing the specific problems of establishing causation in hazard-
ous waste cases. H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw (2d ed.
1985); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1987); Ora F.
Harris, Jr., Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There Any
Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, A Comment
on Causation, Law Reform, and Guerrilla Warfare, 73 GEO. L.J. 1393 (1985);
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1984); Symposium on
Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CH.-KENr L. REv. 397 (1987); Paul J. Zwier,
"Cause in Fact" in Tort Law: A Philosophical and Historical Examination, 31
DEPAuL L. REv. 769 (1982).
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 41, at 263-65.
32. RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965); see also KEETON ET
AL., supra note 10, §§ 41,42, at 267-68, 278.
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"but for" the defendant's action.33 According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, whether the defendant's actions amounted to
a "substantial factor" in producing the harm depends upon three
considerations: (1) the extent to which the defendant's actions
contributed to the harm, compared to the extent to which other
forces contributed to the harm; (2) whether the defendant's ac-
tions created a force or series of forces that operated up to the
time of the harm, or by contrast, whether the defendant's ac-
tions were harmless until acted upon by forces outside the de-
fendant; and (3) the amount of time that elapsed between the
defendant's actions and the harm.34
Proximate cause requires the plaintiff to establish that its
injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defend-
ant's actions, or that the injury was the direct consequence or
foreseeable indirect consequence of the defendant's actions.35
Given the effect of foreseeability, proximate cause "is merely the
limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's respon-
sibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct."36 Thus,
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 41, at 265-67. Professor Richard
Wright has developed what he terms the "Necessary Element of a Sufficient
Set" (NESS) test of causation: "a particular condition was a cause of (contrib-
uted to) a specific result if and only if it was a necessary element of a set of
antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the re-
sult." Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked
Statistics, and Proof- Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73
IowA L. REv. 1001, 1019 (1988) (footnote and emphasis omitted).
34. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433 (1965).
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 41, at 273; see also id. at 272-80.
Under the Restatement, the fact that the harm resulting from the defendant's
actions was not foreseeable does not excuse a defendant from liability unless
hindsight reveals that it was highly extraordinary that the action brought
about the harm. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 435. The Restatement in-
stead limits responsibility by the term "substantial": "substantial" is intended
to invoke a "reasonable person" test that asks if
the defendants conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to
lead reasonable people to regard it as a cause, using that word in the
popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility,
rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense," which includes every
one of the great number of events without which any happening would
not have occurred.
Id. § 431 cmt. a.
36. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 41, at 264.
In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eter-
nity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events,
and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a ba-
sis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would "set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation." As a practi-
cal matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which
are so closely related with the result and of such significance that the
law is justified in imposing liability.
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even if the defendant's actions in fact caused the plaintiffs in-
jury, the law will not hold the defendant responsible for that in-
jury unless there is a sufficient connection between the actions
and the injury.
Both cause in fact and proximate cause are notoriously diffi-
cult to prove in hazardous waste cases because of three general
problems. First, a site may include many different kinds of haz-
ardous substances3 7 that become even more difficult to identify
when they commingle and migrate.38 Furthermore, the many
different kinds of hazardous substances often come from many
different sources.39 Finally, many years may elapse between the
disposal of hazardous wastes and any resulting injuries.40 In
such cases, extended delay between disposal and injury can
make it extremely difficult to find relevant documents or knowl-
edgeable witnesses to waste disposal practices at a site.41
Several common law tort doctrines address situations in
which causation proves difficult to determine. 42 "Alternative li-
Id. (footnote omitted).
37. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177, 198 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1309-10 (E.D. Mo. 1987); see
also Mary Margaret Fabic, Note, Pursuing a Cause of Action in Hazardous
Waste Pollution Cases, 29 BuFF. L. Rzv. 533, 541-42 (1980).
38. For example, in United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Dispo-
sal, Inc., involving a storage facility containing 7,200 fifty-five gallon drums of
different hazardous substances, it "would have cost in the range of $2.5 million
to attempt through analytical means to identify all waste types in the conglom-
erate of materials stored at the [site], approximately five times the cost of sur-
face removal itself." 653 F. Supp. 984, 990, 993 n.6 (D.S.C. 1984), affd in part,
vacated in part, United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); see also Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283,
1286 (D.R.I. 1986) (involving 10,000 barrels and containers).
39. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. involved 289 generators and trans-
porters connected with the site, 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Two
hundred parties were connected with the landfill in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Mur-
tha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1196 (2d Cir. 1992). The Alcan Aluminum Corporation was
one of 83 parties involved with the waste disposal center in the Second Circuit
case. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 1993).
A witness at a congressional hearing referred to over 25,000 defendants being
named in some cases. Superfund Liability Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony
of Harriet L. James, representing the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness, on Feb. 10, 1994).
40. For example, the hazardous wastes found at the Blackbird Mine in
Idaho resulted from cobalt, copper, and gold mining that began in 1917, Idaho
v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1989), and wastes were dis-
posed at the site in United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1268 (3d
Cir. 1993), beginning in 1917 as well.
41. See Harris, supra note 30, at 912; Fabic, supra note 37, at 542-43.
42. Res ipsa loquitur.provides a related example, albeit focused more on an
inference of negligence than an inference of causation. Res ipsa loquitor allows
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ability" provides that when two or more defendants breach a
duty to a plaintiff but uncertainty remains as to which defend-
ant caused the injury, each defendant is jointly and severally
liable unless it can prove that it did not cause the injury.43
Thus, in Summers v. Tice,44 the court held two hunters-who
fired identical guns simultaneously-jointly and severally liable
because neither hunter could prove which shot actually hit the
plaintiff.45 The assumption that the defendants are more likely
than the plaintiff to know who caused the injury, and the desire
to assure that the plaintiff can obtain a remedy, provide the dual
justifications for the theory.46 But stretching this common law
tort theory to the CERCLA context proves difficult. In hazard-
ous waste cases, the injury usually occurs over an extended pe-
riod of time, a large number of possible defendants often exists,
and only some defendants are likely to be joined in the case, so
that the party who actually caused the injury may not be pres-
ent in court.47
Courts also have applied a "concert of action" theory when a
group of defendants have participated in "a common plan or de-
sign to commit a tortious act."48 The usual example of the the-
ory, which derives from the criminal concept of aiding and
abetting, holds both drivers who agree to a drag race liable when
a court to infer negligence from circumstantial evidence when ordinary experi-
ence suggests that the injury must have resulted from a particular action. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 39, at 244-48. For example, the escape of toxic
gases from a building suggests that the owner of the building acted negligently,
despite the plaintiffs inability to prove how the release occurred. Id. § 39, at
245 & n.32 (citing cases). Yet using res ipsa loquitur to determine hazardous
waste liability may not achieve the doctrine's purpose. As one commentator
observed, although res ipsa loquitur prevents a group of defendants from form-
ing a "conspiracy of silence" about what actually happened, in cases involving
abandoned hazardous waste sites "[t]he defendants are not necessarily in any
better position than the government to show whose wastes were contained in
the release." Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1458, 1522 n.51 (1986).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1989).
44. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
45. Id. at 2-3.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. f(1989); Summers v.
Tice, 199 P.2d at 4-5.
47. The same factors have discouraged courts from employing alternative
liability in DES cases. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Laura A. Abrams, Comment, The DES
Dilemma: A Study in How Hard Cases Make Bad Law, 59 U. CiN. L. REv. 489,
497-500 (1990).
48. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 46, at 323; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 876 (1989).
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one hits a third party.49 But there is no concert of action in most
hazardous waste cases because the contamination results from
the independent decisions of countless defendants over an ex-
tended period of time.
Two other common law doctrines go further, however.
"Market share liability," developed in litigation over the injuries
suffered by women whose mothers took the drug diethylstilbes-
trol (DES) during pregnancy, apportions liability by the size of a
company's market share of the injurious product. In the leading
case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,50 the California Supreme
Court held that upon proof that the defendants were manufac-
turers of a substantial share of the drug on the market in which
plaintiffs mother purchased the drug, "[e]ach defendant will be
held liable for the proportion of the judgement represented by its
share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not
have made the product which caused plaintiffs injuries."51
While several courts have adopted different theories of market
share liability,52 each has applied the doctrine narrowly, limit-
ing its effect to "cases in which all of the defendants produced an
identical product, and the plaintiff ha[d] joined enough defend-
ants to represent a substantial share of the market."53
Using this doctrine in the CERCLA context once again
proves problematic. CERCLA cases rarely involve a group of de-
49. RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876, at 315 (1989); see also Shackil
v. Lederle Lab., 561 A.2d 511, 515 (N.J. 1989) (discussing concert of action the-
ory in context of DES cases).
50. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
51. Id. at 937; KEETON Er AL., supra note 10, § 41, at 271; see also id. § 103,
at 714 (discussing proof in market share liability cases).
52. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991); Conley
v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539
N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689
P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). By contrast, other courts have rejected mar-
ket share liability theories. See Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67
(Iowa 1986) (en banc); Zaift v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc). For discussions of market share liability, pro and con, see Aaron D.
Twerski, Market Share-A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 869
(1989); Abrams, supra note 47, at 502-12; Petrina R. Albulescv, Note, Market
Share Liability-The California Roulette of Causation Eliminating the Identifi-
cation Requirement, 11 SETON HALL L. REv. 610 (1981); Andrew B. Nance, Note,
Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a Decade-Old Doctrine, 44
VAD. L. REv. 395 (1991); Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES
Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981).
53. Developments, supra note 42, at 1523; see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 10, § 103, at 714.
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fendants that produced an identical substance. 54 Most market
share liability theories, moreover, limit a defendant's liability to
its share of the market,55 while CERCLA permits joint and sev-
eral liability for all of the plaintiffs damages.56 As a result, a
plaintiff may not be able to recover all of its damages under a
market share approach, contrary to one of the goals of CERCLA.
Finally, academic writers favor a "probabilistic causation"
theory specifically addressing hazardous substances cases.5 7
Rather than imposing liability depending on the likelihood that
a particular defendant caused the injury (as in market share lia-
bility), probabilistic causation permits plaintiffs to recover de-
pending on the likelihood that they were injured by a particular
product. A defendant is liable in proportion to the likelihood
that it caused the plaintiffs injury.58 Thus, under a probabilis-
tic causation system, a plaintiff would recover 30 percent of its
total damages from that defendant if a 30 percent likelihood ex-
ists that a defendant caused the plaintiffs injury.5e Again, both
the many different types of injuries and the many different ac-
tivities that may have caused the injury make it difficult to em-
ploy a probabilistic causation system in hazardous substances
cases.
These common law concepts provide the framework in
which the courts would have determined CERCLA liability us-
ing the causation approach of the House bill.6 0 Perhaps one of
54. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
55. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 103, at 714.
56. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
57. Farber, supra note 30, at 1220.
58. The proponents of probabilistic causation include Richard Delgado, Be-
yond Sindell: Relation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70
CAL. L. REV. 881, 899-902 (1982); Developments, supra note 42, at 1619-24; Wil-
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for
Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 417, 425-31 (1984); Rosen-
berg, supra note 30, at 881-87; Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L. J. 1389, 1392 (1985). Professor Daniel Farber ar-
gues against this consensus, favoring instead a "most likely victim" approach
that would fully compensate those plaintiffs whose injuries were most likely
caused by the defendant, while denying any compensation to those plaintiffs
whose injuries were least likely caused by the defendant. Farber, supra note
30, at 1221.
59. Farber, supra note 30, at 1220-21.
60. Note, however, that the House bill would have imposed liability on a
person who "caused or contributed to the release or threatened release" of haz-
ardous substances. Inclusion of the words "or contributed to" seems to denote
an expansion of the common law concept of causation and is similar to RCRA
§ 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), but there is no evidence of what the House in-
tended. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a)(D), reprinted in 2 CERCLA
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these theories of causation would have gained currency under
this approach. More likely, the liability standard adopted by the
House bill would have created its own federal common law.61
These arguments nonetheless remain hypothetical because Con-
gress adopted an altogether different approach.
II. THE RESPONSIBLE PARTY MODEL
The statute Congress enacted contained the Senate's ap-
proach to causation. 62 The Senate bill specified in the statute
itself the precise elements of liability instead of simply relying
on the common law understanding of those who "caused or con-
tributed" to hazardous waste contamination. Courts reading the
enacted language of CERCLA63 have identified four elements of
a private plaintiff's prima facie case: (1) the defendant falls
LnGIsLATrvE HIsTORY, supra note 2, at 438 (emphasis added). Five opponents of
the House bill complained that "a generator of hazardous waste could be inter-
preted to have 'contributed to' a release merely by generating the waste that
was released. This would place an unfair burden on the waste generator. The
mere fact of generating a hazardous waste should not make the generator lia-
ble." 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 98 (supplemental views
of Reps. Broyhill, Devine, Collins, Loeffler and Stockman).
61. In fact, the House expected this. See 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 64.
62. See supra note 4.
63. CERCLA section 107(a) provides the following:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incinera-
tion vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and contain-
ing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study car-
ried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
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within any of the four categories of covered persons; (2) "a re-
lease, or threatened release" of a hazardous substance from a
"facility" occurred; (3) the plaintiff incurred "response costs"; 64
and (4) these costs were the "necessary costs of response... con-
sistent with the national contingency plan."65 The four catego-
ries of "responsible parties" liable for hazardous substance
contamination include parties who are current owners or opera-
tors of a facility, those who owned or operated a facility at the
time of disposal, those who arranged to dispose or treat hazard-
ous substances at the facility, most notably the generators of the
waste, and those who transported hazardous substances to the
facility.6 6 Finally, the statute enumerates three specific de-
fenses that require a defendant to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that both the release and the consequent damages
resulted from an act of God, an act of war, or an act of a third
party completely unrelated to the defendant, provided that the
defendant exercised due care and took precautions against the
release.67
64. In addition to response costs, CERCLA imposes liability for another
type of injury-damage to natural resources-and provides a different causa-
tion requirement for such damages. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988). One
court has held that this provision requires that "the damage for which recovery
is sought must still be causally linked to the act of the defendant." Idaho v.
Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986). The First Circuit dis-
tinguished Bunker Hill from actions to recover response costs, explaining that
although the natural resources provision requires "a connection between the
defendant and the damages to the natural resources," the general liability pro-
vision requires "a connection between the defendant and the response costs
(and no mention is made of any damages at all)." Dedham Water Co. v. Cum-
berland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1154 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989).
65. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co., 889 F.2d at 1150 (listing CERCLA ele-
ments). The same elements apply to an action brought by the government ex-
cept that the necessary costs of response need only be "not inconsistent" with
the National Contingency Plan. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988). Most courts require the defendant to prove that the
costs are not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan, although a few
courts have placed the burden on the government. See, e.g., In re Bell Petro-
leum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 906 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing cases).
66. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The third and fourth ba-
ses for liability are known as "generator" or "arranger" liability and "trans-
porter" liability respectively. See, e.g., Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F.
Supp. 1063, 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
67. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). SARA amended the
third-party defense to protect "innocent landowners" who tried but did not learn
about the contamination before they acquired the property. See CERCLA
§ 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). All three defenses are typically defenses
to strict liability in other contexts. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Mater-
ials & Servs., Inc., 811 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
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The statutory language says nothing about the plaintiff's
threshold need to establish that the defendant's actions
caused-either in fact or proximately-the contamination at the
site. The lack of attention to causation in CERCLA's language
makes it difficult to determine the relevancy of causation in de-
termining whether a company or an individual is a responsible
party, in apportioning liability, and in allocating liability among
responsible parties. The Alcan decisions help clarify these
issues.
A. CAUSATION AND THE DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
The absence of any specific causation provision in the statu-
tory language has not deterred defendants from arguing that
CERCLA requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant's
actions-which could be the ownership or operation of a facility,
the disposal of hazardous waste generated by the defendant, or
the transportation of such waste-were the cause in fact of the
plaintiffs injury. The Alcan cases illustrate these arguments. 68
The Alcan Aluminum Corporation contended that CERCLA re-
quired the government to prove that the company's emulsion
caused the release and the government's response costs. 69 The
68. Alcan unsuccessfully advanced two other defenses besides causation.
It argued that CERCLA contains a minimum amount requirement, so that lia-
bility does not attach to a de minimis amount of a hazardous substance. Both
courts rejected this argument, as had previous courts. See United States v. Al-
can Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259-61 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Amoco Oil Co. v.
Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1989); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v.
ASARCO, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 358, 361 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States v.
Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Alcan also argued that
its wastes were not hazardous according to EPA reporting requirements.
Again, both courts disagreed. See Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 720-21; Alcan (3d
Cir.), 964 F.2d at 261-64. But see generally Westerfield, supra note 14.
69. 990 F.2d at 720; 964 F.2d at 264. Alcan manufactured aluminum sheet
and plate products at a plant in Oswego, New York. During the manufacturing
process, the company used an emulsion consisting of deionized water and min-
eral oil to cool and lubricate aluminum ingots. Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 256.
The used emulsion also contained fragments of the aluminum ingots that broke
off during the manufacturing process. Id. Alcan attempted to filter the hazard-
ous substances contained in those fragments before disposing of the emulsion so
that it could reuse the emulsion, but small quantities of hazardous substances
remained. Id. The federal government sued Alcan, along with 82 other defend-
ants, for arranging to dispose of 4.6 million gallons of the emulsion at a waste
disposal center in Oswego. The federal government also sued Alcan, along with
nineteen other defendants, for arranging to dispose of over 2.3 million gallons of
the emulsion at a site in Pittston, Pennsylvania. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at
717; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 256-57. In both cases, all parties except Alcan
settled with the government, which then sought to collect the balance of the
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Second and Third Circuits rejected this argument,70 as had vir-
tually every previous court to consider the question.71 The Al-
can courts offered several rationales to demonstrate Congress's
intention that CERCLA not require proof of causation. Other
rationales simply show why such a scheme makes sense.
The text, structure, and history of the statute indicate that
CERCLA does not require proof of causation. Most importantly,
the statute itself specifies who is liable, and the statutory lan-
guage says nothing about showing cause in fact.72 The absence
of a causation requirement suggests that Congress intended
none, notwithstanding indications in the legislative history that
the common law should resolve unanswered liability issues.73
The silence of the statute acquires added meaning when com-
pared with the House version, which made proof of causation the
cleanup costs from Alcan. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 717; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964
F.2d at 257.
70. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 721; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 266.
71. Like the Alcan decisions, most of these other decisions involved waste
generators. See Beazer, 811 F. Supp. at 1430; United States v. Marisol, Inc.,
725 F. Supp. 833, S40 (M.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298, 1309-10 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1292-93
(D.R.I. 1986); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653
F. Supp. 984, 992-93 (D.S.C. 1984), affd in part, vacated in part, United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Owners have fared equally poorly in making causation arguments. See New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Cauffman, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,161 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
72. The courts have been especially insistent about this point. See Alcan
(3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 264 ("The statute does not, on its face, require the plaintiff
to prove that the generator's hazardous substances themselves caused the re-
lease or caused the incurrence of response costs; rather, it requires the plaintiff
to prove that the release or threatened release caused the incurrence of response
costs, and that the defendant is a generator of hazardous substances at the
facility."); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Dairy Farms, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146,
1152 (1st Cir. 1989) ("A literal reading of the statute imposes liability if releases
or threatened releases from defendant's facility cause the plaintiff to incur re-
sponse costs; it does not say that liability is imposed only if the defendant
causes actual contamination of the plaintiffs property."); United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The traditional elements of tort
culpability on which the site-owners rely simply are absent from the statute.
The plain language of section 107(a)(2) extends liability to owners of waste fa-
cilities regardless of their degree of participation in the subsequent disposal of
hazardous waste."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
73. See 1 CERCLA LEGIsLA=rCv HISTORY, supra note 2, at 686 (statement
of Sen. Randolph) ("It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act,
if any, shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common
law.").
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sole determining consideration in establishing liability.74 The
speed with which Congress drafted the compromise CERCLA
language, and the absence of any legislative history or other in-
dication of why Congress chose the Senate "responsible party"
approach instead of the House "cause or contribute" approach,
precludes any authoritative claims about the congressional pur-
pose in enacting the statute as now written. The sparse legisla-
tive history is murky on this point.75 Nonetheless, that the
statute simply says what it says, and does not say what the
House would have said, provides powerful support for finding
evidence of cause in fact unnecessary. Also, the inclusion of
three statutory causation-based affirmative defenses suggests
that Congress did not intend to impose the burden of establish-
ing causation on the plaintiff.76
74. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170 n.17 ("Congress specifically declined to
include a similar nexus requirement in CERCLA. ... The legislature thus elim-
inated the element of causation from the plaintiffs liability case."); accord
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264-65 (3d Cir. 1992);
Dedham Water Co., 889 F.2d at 1153; Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1044-45;
Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1309 n.10; United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp.
1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Violet, 648 F. Supp. at 1291-92; South Carolina
Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 992 n.4; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
75. Compare 126 CONG. REc. 31,969 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill) (ar-
guing against the bill because "[t]here is no language requiring any causal con-
viction [presumably he meant connection] with a release of a hazardous
substance") with 126 CONG. REc. 30,972 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Helms) ("The
Government can sue a defendant under the bill only for those costs and dam-
ages that it can prove were caused by the defendant's conduct."). The Second
Circuit in Shore Realty Corp. dismissed Senator Helms's comments as "fighting
a rearguard action by that remark, or, more likely, he may have been referring
to the causation defenses in § 9607(b)." 759 F.2d at 1045 n.19. While this ex-
planation is plausible, the fact that CERCLA's legislative history is confusing
and contradictory, see, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Dairy Farms,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986), provides an equally likely explanation.
Of course, others have debated the extent to which legislative history can ever
answer questions about congressional purpose. See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle,
Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203, 249 n.225 (1993) (listing recent academic
commentary on the use of legislative history).
76. See infra part III.B.2. The court in Monsanto considered these defenses
as evidence that Congress "allocated the burden of disproving causation to the
defendant who profited from the generation and inexpensive disposal of hazard-
ous waste." 858 F.2d at 170; see also Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 265 (asserting
that "[i]mputing a specific causation requirement would render these defenses
superfluous"); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d. Cir.
1985) (stating that "a causation requirement makes superfluous the affirmative
defenses provided in section 9607(b)"); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1292
(D.R.I. 1986) (concluding that an interpretation of CERCLA requiring a causa-
tion element "would reduce the CERCLA defenses to statutory surplusage").
By contrast, the court in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Servs.,
Inc. insisted that reading the statute to require a plaintiff to prove causation
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The Alcan and other courts have described additional rea-
sons that explain why Congress might not have wanted to im-
pose a causation requirement, although these reasons offer no
independent evidence that Congress consciously made that
choice. The first explanation, the difficulty a plaintiff en-
counters in trying to prove that the actions of a particular de-
fendant were the cause in fact of the hazardous substances,
especially at sites where many companies and individuals con-
tributed substances, could defeat CERCLA's purpose of assuring
prompt cleanup.7 7 Courts frequently have referred to the impos-
sibility or prohibitive expense of "fingerprinting" hazardous
wastes.78 For example, the Monsanto court assumed that "Con-
gress knew of the synergistic and migratory capacities of leaking
chemical waste, and the technological infeasibility of tracing im-
properly disposed waste to its source."7 9 This difficulty in prov-
ing causation argues strongly for establishing a liability scheme
would not render the statutory defenses superfluous. The Beazer court, how-
ever, relied on its minority view that CERCLA does not require proof of a causal
nexus between an actual release and a plaintiffs response costs. 811 F. Supp.
1421, 1429 n.16 (E.D. Cal 1993).
77. See Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 264-65; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170;
Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1309-11. A related argument claims that a reduced cau-
sation standard fulfills the congressional goal of placing the cost of hazardous
waste cleanups on the industries that handle hazardous substances. See Bliss,
667 F. Supp. at 1311.
78. The district court in Wade stated that "to require a plaintiff under
CERCLA to 'fingerprint' wastes is to eviscerate the statute." 577 F. Supp. at
1332; see also O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n.4 (1st Cir. 1989); Monsanto,
858 F.2d at 169 n.15; United States v. Marisol, 725 F. Supp. 833, 840 (M.D. Pa.
1989); Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1309-10; Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County,
659 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (D. Del. 1987), affd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); Violet
v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1292 n.8 (D.R.I. 1986); Developments, supra note
42, at 1522.
79. 858 F.2d at 170. Another court explained that "[tihe statute takes into
account the synergistic potential of improperly managed hazardous substances
and essentially presumes a contributory 'causal' relationship between each of
the hazardous substances disposed at a site and the hazardous conditions ex-
isting at the site." United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984, 992 n.5. (D.S.C. 1984), affd in part, vacated in part, United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989). In fact, some members of Congress acknowledged the causation difficul-
ties inherent in establishing liability for hazardous waste contamination. See 1
CERCLA LEaisLATrvE HIsTORY, supra note 2, at 75 (testimony of EPA Assistant
Administrator Thomas C. Jorling); see also id. at 82 (testimony of Mr. Jorling).
Causation received more attention with respect to the provisions in the Senate
bill which would have permitted the recovery of individual medical expenses
resulting from hazardous substance contamination, but those provisions were
excluded from CERCLA as enacted. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
108-115 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIv HISTORY, supra note 2, at
305, 415-22 (supplemental views of Sen. Stafford); id. at 119-20, reprinted in 1
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that does not require such proof, but proof difficulties alone do
not lead necessarily to an inference that Congress knowingly
drafted CERCLA to exclude a causation requirement. Rather,
difficulties of proof help explain why Congress wrote the statute
as it did.
Other arguments experience similar limitations. Some
courts have worried that polluters could act to circumvent liabil-
ity if they required plaintiffs to establish causation. "[If the
current owner of a site could avoid liability merely by having
purchased the site after chemical dumping had ceased, waste
cites certainly would be sold, following the cessation of dumping,
to new owners who could avoid the liability otherwise required
by CERCLA."80 This rationale does not explain, however, why
anyone eagerly would buy such a site. Presumably, the pollut-
ing owner either must sell the property at a greatly reduced
price to attract a willing purchaser or show that others would
pay for the cleanup. Moreover, even if the succeeding owner
would not be liable, the polluting owner still would be liable for
the plaintiffs costs of cleaning up the site.81
Finally, courts have submitted that interpreting CERCLA
as requiring a plaintiff to prove causation would punish those
who are careful and reward those who are not.8 2 If a generator
becomes liable only when it knows the whereabouts of its waste
disposal, then the generator has an incentive simply to give its
wastes to a transporter and not ask any questions.83 This also
may prove true, but the reasoning provides an inadequate justi-
fication for reading CERCLA to exclude altogether a causation
requirement.
B. PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION INHERENT IN THE RESPONSIBLE
PARTY SCHEME
Although identifying a responsible party under CERCLA
does not require proof that the defendant's actions caused the
plaintiffs injury, causation plays a more subtle role in the statu-
CERCLA LEGIsLATvE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 426-27 (additional views of
Sens. Domenici, Bentsen, and Baker).
80. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1045.
81. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
82. See Violet, 648 F. Supp. at 1292. Congress plainly intended to create
an incentive to use greater care in handling and disposing of hazardous wastes.
See S. REP. No. 868, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA
LEGIsLATrvE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 322.
83. Violet, 648 F. Supp. at 1292.
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tory scheme.8 4 Consider three events: the defendant's actions,
the release of hazardous substances, and the plaintiffs injury.
The statutory definition of "responsible party" and other parts of
CERCLA's liability provisions require showing a nexus between
the first and the second events, and also between the second and
the third events. CERCLA, however, does not require a direct
connection between the first and third events.
First, CERCLA requires a relationship between a defend-
ant's actions and the release (or threatened release) of hazard-
ous substances at a site. The nature of that relationship
depends upon the category of responsible party into which the
defendant falls. Each category, in turn, is based on an inherent
nexus between that party and the injury suffered by the plain-
tiff.8 5 For generators, the nexus comes from a showing that a
defendant produced hazardous substances that were shipped to
the site, and that hazardous substances like those of the genera-
tor (or the generator's own wastes) existed at the site when a
release of hazardous substances occurred.8 6 For transporters,
84. See, e.g., Scott Wilsdon, Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability:
Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261,
1261 (1987) (i[T]he judicial trend has been to extend liability to parties whose
connection to waste disposal may be less than obvious." (footnote omitted)); see
also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., 811 F. Supp. 1421,
1430 (E.D. Cal. 1993) ("CERCLA does not import traditional tort notions of cau-
sation, but rather imposes a nexus requirement." (citations omitted)); Louisi-
ana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 358, 362 (W.D. Wash. 1990)
("CERCLA does not eliminate a common law causation standard, but rather it
reduces the causation standard.").
85. The required nexus between the defendant and the release of hazard-
ous substances also depends upon the identification of the appropriate site at
which the release occurred. CERCLA imposes liability for releases "from a fa-
cility." CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see also CERCLA § 101(9), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(9) (defining "facility"). Courts generally give the term "facility" a
broad reading. See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cali-
fornia, 915 F.2d 1355, 1360 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014
(1991). Thus, in United States v. Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., No. MO-88-CA-
05, 1989 WL 165534, at *4-*5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1989), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. In re Bell Petroleum, Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993), the district court
refused to treat the soil and an aquifer as two separate facilities, instead hold-
ing that the defendant was responsible for releases from both the soil and the
aquifer. Accord Beazer, 811 F. Supp. at 1431.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 169 n.15 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp.
615, 625 (D.N.H. 1988); Violet, 648 F. Supp. at 1289. The precise nexus re-
quired for generator liability remains somewhat confusing. Some writers indi-
cate that the generator's own wastes must have been at the site when the
release occurred, even if the plaintiff cannot prove that the generator's wastes
were part of the release. See Developments, supra note 42, at 1521 ("he wastes
need only have been present at the site at the time the release occurred.").
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the plaintiff must show that the defendant brought wastes to
Such a requirement poses a troubling question: What if the wastes disposed of
by the generator at the site are no longer there, either due to removal or migra-
tion? The Wade court could not fathom that a generator could escape liability in
that manner. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa.
1983). The court's concerns seem misplaced, however, because the plaintiffs
response costs in such a situation are completely unrelated to the defendant's
actions. Thus, if a defendant can prove that none of its wastes still reside at the
site because its wastes have migrated or been destroyed, that defendant should
not be liable. See Folino v. Hampden Color & Chem. Co., 832 F. Supp. 757, 764
(D. Vt. 1993); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 237
(W.D. Mo. 1985).
Additionally, a plaintiff need not establish a direct nexus between the gen-
erator's hazardous wastes and the response costs. See Arizona v. Motorola,
Inc., 805 F. Supp. 742, 746 (D. Ariz. 1992); United States v. Western Processing
Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 936 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States v. Stringfellow,
661 F. Supp. 1053, 1059-61 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The statutory language says only
that a release of "a hazardous substance," not necessarily the one produced by
the defendant, must occur. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (em-
phasis added). Thus, some commentators have said that the statute "imposes
liability without requiring proof that the defendant's own wastes or even wastes
of the same type were part of a release." See Developments, supra note 42, at
1521. The statute's reference to "a hazardous substance," as opposed to the
hazardous substance attributable to the defendant, has prompted some courts
to hold that a defendant that satisfies one of the statutory definitions of "re-
sponsible party" is liable for the costs of cleaning up any hazardous substances
at the site. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal Co., 653
F. Supp. 984, 992 n.3 (D.S.C. 1984), affd in part, vacated in part, United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Violet,
648 F. Supp. at 1292-93; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333. Some courts, however,
require the hazardous substances contained in the release to be similar to those
produced by the defendant. The Monsanto court explained that the statutory
reference to "'such hazardous substances' denotes hazardous substances alike,
similar, or of a like kind to those that were present in a generator defendant's
waste or that could have been produced by the mixture of the defendant's waste
with other waste present at the site." 858 F.2d at 169; see also United States v.
Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 411, 416 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
United States v. Marisol, 725 F. Supp. 833, 840 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Violet, 648 F.
Supp. at 1292; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332-33.
A generator is also liable even in the absence of any showing that it knew
where its wastes were being disposed. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169 n.15
(holding that plaintiffs must "present evidence that a generator defendant's
waste was shipped to a site and that hazardous substances similar to those
contained in the defendant's waste remained present at the time of release");
see also Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 626; Violet, 648 F. Supp. at 1290-93; Conserva-
tion Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 234; Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895; Wade, 577 F. Supp.
at 1333 n.3. The justification for not imposing a site-selection requirement is
that the generator could have acted to exercise control over where the hazard-
ous substances were disposed, presumably someplace where no (or at least less)
threat of a release existed. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 720 n.2
(D.R.I. 1988). Nonetheless, courts have held generators liable if a transporter
disobeyed an instruction to take the hazardous wastes somewhere else. See Vi-
olet, 648 F. Supp. at 1293-94.
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the site, that those wastes existed at the site when a release oc-
curred,8 7 and that the transporter selected the site."8 For a cur-
rent owner or operator, a plaintiff must show only that the
defendant currently owns or operates the site. 9 Consequently,
a current owner or operator is liable even if it had no relation-
ship to the site when disposal of the hazardous wastes oc-
curred. 90 In contrast, to find a past owner or operator of a
facility liable, a plaintiff must show that disposal of the hazard-
ous wastes took place during the period of past ownership or op-
eration.9 ' If no "disposal"92 of hazardous substances occurred
87. See Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 623-24 n.4; United States v. Bliss, 667 F.
Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. at
191; South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 1005-06.
88. See Alcatel Info. Sys., Inc. v. Arizona, 778 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz.
1991); United States v. Western Processing, 756 F. Supp. 1416, 1419-20 (W.D.
Wash 1991); South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 1005; United States v.
Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1402-05 (D.N.H. 1985); see also Steven
Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazard-
ous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 233-34 (1988). One writer, however, has
argued that a transporter should be liable even if it did not select the disposal
site. Alice Theresa Valder, Note, The Erroneous Site Selection Requirement for
Arranger and Transporter Liability Under CERCLA, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 2074
(1991).
89. The statutory definition of "owner or operator" as "any person owning
or operating [a] facility," CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii),
is little help. Owners include individuals, e.g., Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 623;
successor corporations, e.g., Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1307-08; and corporate stock-
holders who actively participated in the operation of a facility, e.g., Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1457-58 (W.D. Mich. 1988). Operators
include those who controlled, or had the ability to control, the actions at a site
when the disposal took place. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1992); Nurad, Inc. v. Wil-
liam E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
377 (1992); CPC Int'l v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 788 (W.D.
Mich. 1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986).
90. See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir.
1989) (stating that current owners or operators are "deemed responsible for
some of the harm"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); Artesian Water Co. v.
New Castle, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that CERCLA "ap-
plies to all current owners and operators regardless of whether they owned or
operated the facility when hazardous substances were disposed of there"), affd,
851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988); South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Mon-
talvo, No. 88-8038-CIV-Davis, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17555, at * 5 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 14, 1989) (ruling that owners are liable even if they did not contribute to
the contamination because "Congress clearly intended that the current land-
owner be considered to have 'caused' part of the harm").
91. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, No. 1:90:CV:851, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19082, at *55 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 1993); United States v. Conservation
Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 253 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
92. Disposal can mean more than the initial introduction of a hazardous
substance to a site. A disposal may occur when a defendant moves hazardous
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during the period of the defendant's ownership or operation, the
defendant avoids liability.93
Second, CERCLA requires a relationship between the re-
lease of hazardous substances and the plaintiffs injury. One
reason traditional causation analysis differs under CERCLA
stems from the nature of the injury in these cases. Injury in the
CERCLA context means the response costs, or the expenditure
of funds to clean up the site, not necessarily damage to property
worked by the contamination itself.94 In other words, once a
party has expended funds to clean up a site,95 that party has
substances during work on the land at the site. See, e.g., Tanglewood East
Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988) (find-
ing that § 6903(3)'s definition of disposal "does not limit disposal to a one-time
occurrence-there may be other disposals when hazardous materials are
moved, dispersed, or released during landfill excavations and fillings). A dispo-
sal also may occur if hazardous substances that previously were placed at a site
continue to migrate through the site. The courts, however, are divided over
such "passive disposals." Compare Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844-47 (holding that mi-
gration is a disposal); Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659,
662-64 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (same) with United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel,
806 F. Supp. 1346, 1350-53 (N.D. IlM. 1992) (holding that migration is not a
disposal); Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984,
988-89 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (same).
93. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. March 5, 1994).
94. As the court in ASARCO explained:
There is a distinction between "causing a release" and "causing re-
sponse costs." In other words, liability does not attach because the de-
fendant caused "a release," but because it caused "response costs."
While a defendant may often cause both, it is the causing of response
costs that subjects a party to liability under CERCLA.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 358, 362 (W.D. Wash.
1990); see also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d
1146, 1154 n.8 (1st Cir. 1989); Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1282. Indeed,
the court in Dedham Water Co. reversed the district court for failing to consider
"whether defendants releases (or threatened releases) might nonetheless have
caused the plaintiff to incur 'response costs' even though those releases did not
in fact contaminate the wells." 889 F.2d at 1157.
95. In addition to the costs of actually cleaning up the site, "response costs"
include the costs of studies conducted prior to actual cleanup activities, e.g.,
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1990); and depending
on the circuit, attorneys' fees. Compare Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256
(6th Cir.) (allowing recovery of attorneys' fees), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 636
(1993); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991), with In re Hem-
ingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 934-35 (1st Cir.) (refusing recovery of attor-
neys' fees), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993); Stanton Road Assocs. v. Lohrey
Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1993) (same), cert. granted, 114 S.
Ct. 633 (1993), and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 652 (1993); see also FMC Corp. v.
Hewlett Packard Co., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that some attor-
neys' fees are recoverable while others are not). The Supreme Court has agreed
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suffered a compensable injury for purposes of the statute. If
the costs are expended to respond to a threatened release,
the statute plainly requires the plaintiff to prove that the
threatened release caused the response costs. 9 6 Similarly, if
the costs are expended to respond to an actual release, most
courts require a plaintiff to prove that the release caused
the response costs, even though the text of the statute
does not explicitly impose such a requirement.9 7 A private
plaintifV 8 can only recover response costs that are "consistent
with the national contingency plan (NCP),"99 which courts usu-
to decide the attorneys' fees question in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984
F.2d 1025 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 633 (1993).
96. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
97. The text imposes liability at sites "for which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazard-
ous substance." Id. The placement of the comma makes it unclear whether the
"causes the incurrence of response costs" requirement applies to both releases
and threatened releases or only to the latter. Most courts, however, do not limit
the causation requirement to threatened releases. See Dedham Water Co., 889
F.2d at 1152; Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 670 (suggesting that a contrary holding
would subject a defendant to liability even when there is no threat to the envi-
ronment); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., 811 F. 1421,
1424-26 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that costs incurred once the EPA notified the
plaintiff that it would be conducting its own study were not necessary); United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Artesian, 659
F. Supp. at 1278, 1282 & n.22, 1283 & n.25 (applying the "substantial factor"
test of causation); see also Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 742, 746 (D.
Ariz. 1992) (describing issue but finding it unnecessary to resolve it).
Some courts, however, do not require a showing of cause, but instead only
require that the release have "some connection" with the response costs. In
Beazer, the court reasoned that "the most natural reading of the statutory lan-
guage is that the causation language modifies only [the threatened release]
phrase," 811 F. Supp. at 1427, and that such a reading was not irrational be-
cause "Congress could well have assumed that an actual release would inevita-
bly result in the incurrence of response costs while believing a threatened
release would not necessarily do so," id. at 1428. The court also held that "if the
plaintiff is unable to demonstrate some nexus between the defendant and the
incurred response costs, those costs are not necessary and are unlikely to have
been incurred in response to the NCP." Id. at 1430. The dispute thus centers
on the degree of connection between the defendant and the release, not the
existence of a connection. In any event, the Administration bill would fix this
problem by clarifying that both actual and threatened releases must cause the
incurrence of response costs. See S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 404(c) (1994)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)).
98. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Unlike a private
plaintiff, the government can recover response costs as long as they are "not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan." CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). The National Contingency Plan describes the proce-
dures required by the EPA for cleaning up a site. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1993).
99. Some courts have questioned the appropriateness of any response at
all. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, 735 F. Supp. 358, 362 (W.D. Wash.
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ally determine during the remedy and cost phase or during the
allocation phase, not as a defense during the liability phase. 100
CERCLA thus requires that a responsible party must have
some connection to the costs incurred by a plaintiff in cleaning
up hazardous substances. That connection, however, falls well
short of the proof of causation required in traditional tort litiga-
tion. Consequently, the many parties that satisfy the statutory
definition of "responsible party" typically raise causation argu-
ments when they try to limit their liability in apportionment
and allocation determinations.
C. CAUSATION AS A FACTOR IN APPORTIONMENT
The two Alcan courts expressed discomfort with their con-
clusion that causation is not an element of the statutory defini-
tion of a responsible party. After the Second Circuit rejected
Alcan's causation and other defenses, the court acknowledged
that "one would suppose there is no limit to the scope of CER-
CLA liability," a result the court described as "harsh."'0 ' The
Third Circuit expressed concern that its conclusions regarding
causation "would initially appear to lead to unfair imposition of
liability," and that "CERCLA seemingly would impose liability
on every generator of hazardous waste, although that generator
could not, on its own, have caused any environmental harm."10 2
1990) ("[Tlhe relevant factual inquiry here should focus on whether the shot
deposited by USGI at B & L justified any response actions."); United States v.
Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 933 (W.D. Wash. 1990) ("An insub-
stantial release cannot cause the incurrence of response costs because the in-
currence of such costs would not be 'appropriate' under the NCP."). If the court
finds no appropriate costs, then no injury has occurred, and no liability attaches
to the defendant. See Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace Co.-Conn., 801 F. Supp. 1309,
1326 (D.N.J. 1992) ("[A] defense that no proper response costs have been in-
curred is essentially a defense that plaintiff has not been damaged within the
meaning of CERCLA"); United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc., 797
F. Supp. 411, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("If a party can demonstrate that all of the
costs the EPA seeks to recover are inconsistent with the NCP, courts will dis-
miss the case.").
100. See, e.g., Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley Bank, 764 F. Supp. 1377,
1389 (E.D. Cal. 1989); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 630 (D.N.H.
1988).
101. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.
1993).
102. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 267 (3d Cir.
1992). For similar judicial expressions of concern about the fairness of the stat-
utory scheme, see O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the court
"shar[ed] the appellants' concern that they not be ultimately responsible for re-
imbursing more than their just portion of the governments' response costs"),
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The concerns arise in large part from the courts' consistent read-
ing of CERCLA as imposing joint and several liability on each
responsible party in most instances. 103 With joint and several
liability, a court could hold a defendant with little connection to
the site liable for all of the cleanup costs, a result many courts
have decried as unfair. 10 4
So both Alcan courts allowed causation to be "brought back
into the case-through the back door, after being denied entry at
the front door-at the apportionment stage."10 5 They did so by
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 629-30 n.15; United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1339 (E.D. Pa. 1983). EPA Administrator
Browner has acknowledged that "the liability scheme has often been criticized
as being unfair and economically inefficient." Browner Statement, supra note
2.
103. "Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the debate over the virtues
and excesses of CERCLA is the EPA's ability to impose joint and several liabil-
ity...." Noone, supra note 14, at 307. CERCLA itself does not specify whether
or not it imposes joint and several liability. Indeed, Congress eliminated a pro-
vision in the original Senate bill that would have required that joint and several
liability be imposed in all CERCLA cases. 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 486. This last minute change, however, has been construed
simply as providing that liability be determined under common law principles,
providing joint and several liability is appropriate in certain cases. The dele-
tion has not been seen as a deliberate rejection of joint and several liability in
all cases. See Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1337-38; United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572
F. Supp. 802, 807-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983). In 1986, a House committee endorsed
this reading of the law. See H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861-62. The ongoing struggle to
determine when joint and several liability should be imposed is discussed in In
re Bell, 3 F.3d at 894-904; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 & n.23; Chem-Dyne, 572
F. Supp. at 804-08; Wetzel, supra note 14, at 831-34; Developments, supra note
42, at 1524-35; Eric P. Jorgenson, Note, Joint and Several Liability for Hazard-
ous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1982). The courts
continue to be divided about "the timing of the resolution of the divisibility
question, whether equitable factors should be considered, and whether a de-
fendant can avoid liability for all, or only some portion, of the damages." In re
Bell, 3 F.3d at 901.
104. See In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 897; United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d
1265, 1279-80 (3d Cir. 1993); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670
(5th Cir. 1989); Atlas, 797 F. Supp. at 419; ONeil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706,
725 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); A & F, 578 F. Supp. at 1256-57; see also Noone, supra note 14, at
307. One corporate executive, for example, has complained that his company
had to pay all of the cleanup costs at a site where his company was involved for
only five months of the site's six year life. Proposals to Reauthorize the
Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tranr portation and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (testimony of Robert N. Burt on Feb. 3, 1994), available in
LEXIS, LEGIS Library, CNGTST File.
105. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722.
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adding "a common law gloss onto the statutory framework"10 6 to
"infuse fairness into the statutory scheme without distorting its
plain meaning or disregarding congressional intent."10 7 Specifi-
cally, they relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts principles
concerning joint and several liability which permit the appor-
tionment of liability for divisible harms.
Section 433A of the Restatement first asks whether a harm
is divisible (and thus subject to apportionment) or indivisible
(and not subject to apportionment).' 08 If there are distinct
harms or if there is a way to determine the contribution of each
cause to a single harm, courts should apportion damages for the
harm between the causes.' 0 9 Thus, the Second Circuit held that
under § 433A of the Restatement where two or more joint
tortfeasors act independently and cause a distinct or single
harm, for which there is a reasonable basis for division accord-
ing to the contribution of each, then each is liable for damages
only for its own portion of the harm. In other words, the dam-
ages are apportioned. But when each tortfeasor causes a single
indivisible harm, then damages are not apportioned and each is
liable in damages for the entire harm.110 Applying this test, the
Third Circuit held that if Alcan could show that the harm
caused by its wastes was divisible, "it should only be liable for
that portion of the harm fairly attributable to it.""'
Three new ideas emerged from the Alcan decisions. Before
Alcan, courts accepted the theoretical possibility that a defend-
106. Id. at 721.
107. Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 268.
108. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). Thorough discussions
of the application of the Restatement rule to CERCLA appear in In re Bell, 3
F.3d at 895-97; Wetzel, supra note 14, at 835-38; Frank Prager, Apportioning
Liability For Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 198, 199-208
(1986-87).
109. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
110. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722.
111. Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 269. In a subsequent case, the Third Cir-
cuit added that if a defendant "were able to prove that none of the hazardous
substances found at the site were fairly attributable to it, we might conclude
that apportionment was appropriate and [the defendant's] apportioned share
would be zero." United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d. Cir.
1993). The Second Circuit opinion in Alcan is somewhat confusing on this is-
sue, but it reaches the same result. At one point in its opinion, the Second
Circuit wrongly suggested that Alcan could escape "any liability for response
costs" if it proved that the hazardous wastes it disposed of "contributed at most
to only a divisible portion of the harm." Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722. Later,
though, the Second Circuit correctly indicated that Alcan could not escape all
liability for its divisible harm, but would instead be liable for its reasonable
apportionment of responsibility. Id.
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ant could prove that it caused a divisible harm, but primarily
because of the problems posed by commingled wastes, no court
actually had held a harm divisible. 112 By contrast, both Alcan
courts rejected the government's argument that the commin-
gling of hazardous wastes necessarily produces an indivisible
harm.113 Instead, the courts agreed that the divisibility of the
harm was an intensely factual question that prevented sum-
mary judgment on the issue in both cases. 114 The courts
granted Alcan the opportunity on remand to distinguish the
harm caused by its wastes from the harm caused by wastes dis-
posed of by others, through evidence of relative toxicity, migra-
tory potential, degree of migration, and the synergistic
capacities of the hazardous waste. 11-5 This approach recognized
that the Restatement calls for apportionment when "there is a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause
to a single harm," and not just when defendants cause "distinct
harms."116 The Alcan courts, however, did not determine the
relevancy at the apportionment stage of equitable factors like
112. Earlier cases holding that CERCLA liability is joint and several if the
harm is indivisible include United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc.,
889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1037 (1990); ONeil v.
Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990);
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 842
(M.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 629 (D.N.H. 1988);
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
994 (D.S.C. 1984), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp,
572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Several commentators noted, though,
that "no defendant has ever successfully invoked the divisibility defense in any
reported decision." Moore, supra note 14, at 10,529; see also Noone, supra note
14, at 311. The court in In re Bell Petroleum describes the difficulty in estab-
lishing divisibility in the context of commingled wastes. 3 F.3d 889, 895 n.7
(5th Cir. 1993).
113. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722 (2d Cir.
1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270 n.29 (3d. Cir.
1992).
114. See Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 269.
Indeed, the actual decision in both Alcan cases was to deny the government's
motion for summary judgment on liability. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 725;
Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 271.
115. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 270 n.29,
271; see also Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173 n.26; Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at
811. The way in which these factors affect the divisibility determination is ana-
lyzed in Moore, supra note 14, at 10,531; Rockwood & Harrison, supra note 14,
at 10,548; Noone, supra note 14, at 319.
116. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433A(1) (1965). The comments to
the Restatement contain several examples of how apportionment should work
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those considered in allocating liability among responsible
parties."17
Equally important, the timing of the causation inquiry trou-
bled both Alcan courts. Before the Alcan decisions, courts rou-
tinely imposed joint and several liability because they did not
apportion damages."18 The Third Circuit, by contrast, sug-
gested consideration of the apportionment issue at the initial li-
ability stage, before a determination of joint and several
liability.119 The court expressed concern that the "logical conse-
quence of delaying the apportionment determination may well
be drastic, for it seems clear that a defendant easily could be
strong-armed into settling when other defendants have settled
in order to avoid being held liable for the remainder of the re-
sponse costs." 120 The Second Circuit, although it preferred the
Third Circuit's "common sense approach," thought that fixing li-
ability first for enforcement purposes and then later litigating
the contribution from other responsible parties, "may be con-
trary to the statutory dictates of CERCLA."121 The Fifth Cir-
cuit's subsequent decision in In re Bell Petroleum Services,
in pollution cases. See In re Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895-96; Prager, supra
note 108, at 206 n.26; Noone, supra note 14, at 311, 320.
117. See Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d 711; Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d 252; see
infra part II.D. Courts and writers disagree about the use of equitable factors
in determining divisibility. Compare Noone, supra note 14, at 322 (recom-
mending use of equitable factors) with In re Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 901-02
(arguing against use of equitable factors); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2
F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); Moore, supra note 14, at 10,532
(same).
118. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
119. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270 n.29 (3d
Cir. 1992). The court thus rejected the government's argument that divisibility
is relevant only in a CERCLA § 113(f)(1) contribution action, not in a
§ 107(a)(1) action to recover response costs. Id.; accord Hatco Corp. v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1330-31 (D.N.J. 1992).
120. Alcan (3d Cir.), 964 F.2d at 270 n.29; see also United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d 160, 176-77 (4th Cir. 1988) (Widener, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
121. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 723 (2d Cir.
1993). One writer responds that "to the extent that one of CERCLA's purposes
is to 'expedite civil actions,' resolution of divisibility issues early in the litigation
will likely accomplish that purpose, because it will resolve what are usually the
most significant issues that impede settlement." Rockwood & Harrison, supra
note 14, at 10,547 (footnote omitted). Similarly, another writer explains that
"[b]ecause the divisibility defense challenges the application ofjoint and several
liability to a particular defendant, divisibility of harm may be an appropriate
affirmative defense during the liability phase of litigation." Moore, supra note
14, at 10,530.
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Inc.122 stated its preference for an early resolution but left the
matter in the discretion of the trial court.123
Finally, the Alcan courts described a way in which Alcan
could escape any liability at the site. The Second Circuit held
that Alcan could escape liability if the company showed that its
hazardous wastes-even when combined with other wastes-
"did not contribute to the release and clean-up costs that fol-
lowed."124 The court thus "adopt[ed] a special exception to the
usual absence of a causation requirement" which "is applicable
only to claims, like Alcan's, where background levels are not ex-
ceeded."' 25 The Third Circuit's discussion of Alcan's argument
that its wastes did not exceed background levels indicates that
the court would agree with the Second Circuit's position, but the
Third Circuit remanded the issue to the district court without
reaching that issue.' 26
The Alcan decisions indicate that "the time has come to take
CERCLA divisibility arguments seriously,"127 and because cau-
sation is fundamental to determining divisibility and apportion-
ment, it resurfaces as a key issue. Yet the Alcan courts seemed
apologetic for allowing causation "in through the back door" at
the apportionment stage. Moreover, neither decision addressed
the final opportunity to consider causation in CERCLA cases-
the allocation of liability among defendants identified as respon-
sible parties.
122. In re Bell Petroleum Servs. Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993).
123. Id. at 901.
124. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722. Alcan argued that "it was technically
impossible for its waste to have contributed to a release, because its waste di-
luted the other waste at the site, and the metals in its waste were below ambi-
ent levels." Rockwood & Harrison, supra note 14, at 10,546.
125. Alcan (2d Cir.), 990 F.2d at 722; see also id. ("[C]ausation-with the
burden on the defendant-is reintroduced only to permit a defendant to escape
payment where its pollutants did not contribute more than background contam-
ination and also cannot concentrate."). The statute itself provides that a re-
moval or remedial action is inappropriate for a release "of a naturally occurring
substance in its unaltered form, or altered solely through naturally occurring
processes or phenomena, from a location where it is naturally found." CERCLA
§ 104(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3XA) (1988); see also Amoco Oil Co. v. Bor-
den, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing concern over establish-
ing liability for naturally occurring substances).
126. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270 & n.29 (3d
Cir. 1992). In particular, the court stated that "if Alcan proves the emulsion did
not or could not, when mixed with other hazardous wastes, contribute to the
release and the resultant response costs, then Alcan should not be responsible
for any response costs." Id. at 270.
127. Noone, supra note 14, at 325.
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D. CAUSATION AS A FACTOR IN ALLOCATING LIABILITY
Causation operates as a key element in allocating liability
among responsible parties.128 The compelling arguments
against reading CERCLA to require proof of causation in the ini-
tial determination of responsibility129 disappear at the next step
of allocating liability among responsible parties. CERCLA sec-
tion 113(f) thus authorizes a defendant found liable for response
costs to seek contribution from other responsible parties.130 Sec-
tion 113(f) provides that "[i]n resolving contribution claims, the
court may allocate response costs among liable parties using
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropri-
ate."13 ' Some courts have relied on this provision in allocating
liability among responsible parties even in the absence of a for-
mal contribution action. 132
Most courts examine the factors contained in an amend-
ment to the House bill added by then-Representative Gore. Of
the six so-called "Gore factors,"' 33 five relate to causation.'
3 4
Although the final version of CERCLA did not include the Gore
128. Some courts use the term "apportionment" to describe two different
proceedings: the initial determination of the divisibility of harm among differ-
ent causes, and following the imposition of joint and several liability, the deter-
mination of how much each responsible party must pay. See United States v.
Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987). This Article refers to
the first phase as "apportionment" and the second phase as "allocation." Accord
Moore, supra note 14, at 10,532.
129. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
130. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (D.
Md. 1991). But see United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (3d
Cir. 1993).
133. These factors include the following:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution
to a discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste can be
distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the
hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of
such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or
local officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the
environment.
2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 440. The Senate bill con-
tained a similar list except that it omitted factor (v). See S. REP. No. 848, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, 345-46.
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factors, in the absence of any statutory direction, courts have
relied on those factors as evidence of legislative intent regarding
allocation of liability. 135 The Gore factors are not exclusive,
though, and courts have considered other factors, such as the
financial resources of the parties involved, 136 the benefits the
parties received from their activities, 13 7 and the knowledge the
parties had of the contaminating activities. 138 The resulting in-
quiry thus focuses not only on causation, but also on fault-a
negligence concept foreign to the initial determination of respon-
sibility under CERCLA.
The allocation of liability in Hastings Buildings Products,
Inc. v. National Aluminum Corp. ' 3 9 illustrates the process. Na-
tional Aluminum ("National") operated a manufacturing plant
in Hastings, Michigan between 1969 and April 1986. Hastings
Buildings Products ("Hastings") bought the plant and began op-
erating it in May 1986. The state discovered contaminated
tanks at the site about the time of the sale and Hastings brought
suit. The court held that both National and Hastings were re-
sponsible parties under CERCLA, but that National should be
responsible for 75% of the cleanup costs while Hastings should
be responsible for 25% of the costs. The court reasoned that
"National had a greater degree of involvement in the generation,
treatment and storage of the hazardous waste," and that Has-
tings "merely inherited a system of storage and non-treatment
134. Factors i) and (iv) are directly related to causation. Factors (ii), (iii),
and (v) can relate to causation. Only factor (vi) is unrelated.
135. See In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 921-22 n.4 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993); Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v.
Ensco, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. R.W. Mayer,
Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991) (Guy, J., concurring); US Steel Sup-
ply Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 36 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1330, 1341 (N.D. Ill.
1992); United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 934-35 (W.D.
Wash. 1990); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57
(S.D. IM. 1984); see also Allied Corp. v. ACME Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F.
Supp. 1100, 1116-17 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (rejecting argument that the House com-
mittee's 1986 endorsement of Chem-Dyne constituted rejection of the Gore fac-
tors). For a general discussion of the factors considered by courts and a
proposed economic model for cost allocation, see John C. Butler et al., Allocat-
ing Superfund Costs: Cleaning Up the Controversy, 23 ENvTL. L. REP. 10, 133
(1993).
136. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1206 (2d Cir. 1992).
137. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (D. Md.
1991); South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, No. 88-8038-CIV-Davis,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17555, at *7-*8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 1989).
138. See Weyerhaeuser Co., 771 F. Supp. at 1426.
139. Hastings Buildings Products, Inc. v. National Aluminum Corp., 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11533 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
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that had been determined by National."140 The court next noted
that National had used the offending system for eight years
while Hastings had used it for only eight months.141 National's
actions therefore produced a more substantial cause of the con-
tamination than Hastings. The court further relied on the
greater degree of care exercised by Hastings. 142
In short, CERCLA as currently written demands the
threshold result reached by the Second and Third Circuits in the
Alcan cases: the statute does not require proof that a defend-
ant's actions caused the contamination. On the other hand, the
Alcan courts rightly treated causation as a factor in allocating
liability among responsible parties. This result entirely satis-
fied neither Alcan nor the government, but the Second Circuit
properly noted that the courts must take CERCLA as written. 143
Yet the Alcan decisions simply beg the question of what
CERCLA should provide. Perhaps CERCLA should require
proof of causation before imposing liability. Or perhaps proof of
the absence of causation should suffice to exonerate a defendant.
The uneasiness of the Second and Third Circuits with their con-
clusions that causation is irrelevant for purposes of CERCLA li-
ability provides only the most recent evidence of the need to
reexamine the role of causation in the statute.
III. A "NO CAUSATION, NO
RESPONSIBILITY" PROPOSAL
Congress designed CERCLA's responsible party scheme to
impose liability for the costs of cleaning up hazardous sub-
stances contamination on those parties responsible for such con-
tamination.1' Under traditional tort principles, causation has
formed part of a determination of responsibility. 145 Yet CER-
CLA does not require proof that the defendant's actions caused
140. Id. at *12-*13.
141. Id. at *13.
142. Id. at *13-*14. By contrast, the court in Weyerhaeuser held the past
owner liable for 40% of the costs, and the actual operator liable for 60% of the
costs. 771 F. Supp. at 1426-27; see also South Florida Management Dist. v.
Montalvo, No. 88-8038-CIV-Davis, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17555, at *10-*11
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 1989) (holding owner liable for 25% and sources of contami-
nants liable for 75%); Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86-87 (D. Me.
1988) (commenting that party that caused environmental damages "should
bear a greater portion of the cleanup costs").
143. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir.
1993).
144. See supra note 2.
145. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiffs injury. Instead, less stringent causation concepts
inhere in the responsible party scheme, and causation plays a
significant role in the statutory defenses and in the apportion-
ment and allocation phases. 146 Instances remain, however, in
which responsibility for cleanup costs attaches to parties who
can prove that they did not cause the contamination at the site.
In still more instances, responsibility exceeds a party's "fair
share" of cleanup costs.
This Article contends that the problems in determining cau-
sation in hazardous substances cases justify excusing the plain-
tiff from establishing causation, but they do not justify holding a
party responsible for cleanup costs when that party affirma-
tively can prove that it did not cause the contamination. If a
party can prove that it did not pollute a site, it should not have
to pay. The same principle suggests that a party that caused
some contamination at the site should be able to limit its liabil-
ity if it can prove the extent of the contamination it caused. Ac-
cordingly, because CERCLA as presently written sometimes
contradicts its stated goal of imposing liability on those parties
responsible for hazardous waste contamination, Congress
should amend CERCLA to better relate responsibility to
causation.
A. CAUSATION AND REsPONsIBILTY
The concepts of causation and responsibility are interre-
lated and not readily distinguished. Causation emphasizes an
objective inquiry into the relationship between certain events,
such as a defendant's actions and a plaintiffs injury, while re-
sponsibility involves a more subjective value judgment, such as
the circumstances in which a defendant should be liable for the
plaintiffs injury.147 CERCLA's effort to reconcile these two con-
cepts proves internally inconsistent. Even though causation
146. See supra part II.B-C.
147. Recent writings on the nature of responsibility include Kenneth S.
Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of
Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. Rnv. 845, 906-07 (1987) (concluding that the shift
toward collective responsibility has not been a sensible development); J.M.
Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 197 (1990) (describing
how the characterization of the facts of a case are important in deciding respon-
sibility); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,
Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuxE L.J. 848 (advocating a lia-
bility scheme based on a feminist theory of responsibility); Robert A. Baruch
Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility
in the Law of the Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1473 (1986) (endorsing
the shift to group responsibility).
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plays a role in defining the categories of responsible parties, in
the statutory defenses, and in the apportionment and allocation
phases, the statute imposes responsibility in some circum-
stances in which a defendant disproves causation.
But CERCLA's schizophrenic approach to causation and re-
sponsibility is not unique. Other writers and courts contend
that causation is a fundamental element of responsibility even
though they impose responsibility when no evidence of causation
exists,' 14 as best illustrated by Timothy Lytton's thoughtful es-
say on responsibility.' 49 Lytton differentiates between models
of responsibility based on awareness and models based on par-
ticipation. Under an awareness model like traditional tort law,
responsibility attaches only if an individual is aware that its ac-
tions could cause harm to others. 150 Under a participation
model, responsibility attaches whenever an individual partici-
pates in practices that contribute to another's injury.' 51 Lytton
148. See supra part II; see infra notes 149-171 and accompanying text.
149. Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness,
Participation, and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 472 (1993).
150. Id. at 472-83. Lytton elaborates as follows:
The central distinguishing feature of responsibility under the par-
adigm of awareness is awareness ofa potential for the type of harm that
results. According to this model, determining a person's responsibility
for the suffering of others requires examination of his decision to act.
To incur responsibility, a person's process of deliberation in choosing to
act must include an awareness of the possibility for injurious conse-
quences. Under the paradigm of awareness, one must choose to harm
another, or at least choose to run the risk of doing so, in order to be
responsible for any resulting injury....
According to the paradigm of awareness, holding a person respon-
sible for harm that she did not or could not have known about would be
unfair.
Id. at 474-75.
151. Id. at 471. Lytton adds the following:
According to this approach, an individual who chooses to act in a way
that contributes to the suffering of another is responsible for that per-
son's suffering. This is so regardless of whether the actor considered
the possibility of harm when determining how to act. More precisely,
while choosing to act entails that a person have in mind some conse-
quence or purpose of his action, it does not require that he be aware of
any particular consequence. According to the paradigm of participa-
tion, a person should be responsible for even unanticipated harms....
... According to the paradigm of participation, when an individual suf-
fers due to the actions of another, it seems only fair to place responsi-
bility for the harm on the injurer. To place responsibility on the victim
compounds the initial injury, for "blaming the victim" is itself a form of
inflicting further harm....
* * * Thus, according to the paradigm of participation, when injury is
caused by another person's actions, the innocence of a victim demands
that responsibility fall on the injurer.
Id. at 477-78 (footnotes omitted).
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holds up CERCLA as an example of the participation model be-
cause responsibility "rests upon a generator's participation in
the dumping of hazardous substances at the site in question, re-
gardless of how substantially, directly, or knowingly it is con-
nected with the substances that were actually the subject of the
clean-up."1 52
Yet CERCLA's imposition of responsibility on "responsible
parties," even when such parties can prove that they did not
harm the plaintiff, exposes an inconsistency in Lytton's claim
that CERCLA represents an example of the participation model.
On the one hand, Lytton seems to acknowledge the need to es-
tablish causation in both models.1 53 On the other hand, Lytton
cites the New York Court of Appeals' unique theory of market
share liability in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.15 4 as another ex-
ample of the participation model. Hymowitz broke ranks from
earlier market share cases by holding a DES manufacturer lia-
ble to the extent of its share of the relevant market even if the
manufacturer could prove that its product did not cause the
plaintiffs injury.15 5 Chief Judge Wachtler explained the court's
theory:
152. Id. at 495-97. Lytton's other examples are dram-shop liability statutes,
the market share liability case of Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989), and civil liability for pornography.
Lytton, supra note 149, at 492-502. For a discussion of Hymowitz, see infra text
accompanying notes 155-156.
153. Lytton explains that "in both paradigms causation-that harm 'result
from' a choice of action or participation-is necessary in order for responsibility
to attach." Id. at 474. Thus, in the awareness model, the plaintiff must prove
not only that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injury, but further must show
that the defendant was aware (or should have been aware) of the foreseeable
consequences of his or her actions. The participation model equally relies on
causation by imposing responsibility "when an individual suffers due to the ac-
tions of another." Id. at 477 (emphasis added); see also id. at 477
("[Riesponsibility under the paradigm of participation requires only that a per-
son's action contribute causally to another's harm." (footnote omitted)). Lytton
also writes that under the paradigm of responsibility a defendant whose actions
"contribute[] to the suffering of another is responsible for that person's suffer-
ing." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This is reminiscent of the "cause
or contribute" standard of the House bill, which imposed liability depending on
common law standards, including causation. See supra notes 27-30 and accom-
panying text.
154. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). For aca-
demic commentary on Hymowitz, see Symposium, The Problem of the Indeter-
minate Defendant: Market Share Liability Theory, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 863
(1989); Abrams, supra note 47, at 503-12; Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share
Liability: A Current Assessment of a Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REv.
395, 420-31 (1991).
155. 539 N.E.2d at 1078. Other market share decisions permit a defendant
to escape liability if it can prove that its product could not have caused the
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[Blecause liability here is based on the over-all risk produced, and not
causation in a single case, there should be no exculpation of a defend-
ant who, although a member of the market producing DES for preg-
nancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiffs injury. It
is merely a windfall for a producer to escape liability solely because it
manufactured a more identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drug
stores. These fortuities in no way diminish the culpability of a defend-
ant for marketing the product, which is the basis for liability here.
1 56
Hymowitz thus posits that the risk to the general public created
by selling the dangerous product is enough to impose liability, so
evidence regarding the actual effects of that product is
irrelevant.
Lytton fails to reconcile his reliance on Hymowitz with his
statements about the necessity of proof of causation under the
participation model. Although Lytton states that "cause is an
essential feature of responsibility" under the participation
model, 157 Hymowitz "totally eliminated the causation require-
ment."158 To the extent that CERCLA imposes responsibility on
manufacturers and other parties who can prove that they did
not cause a particular plaintiffs injury, CERCLA is more like
Hymowitz than Lytton's general description of the paradigm of
participation. Indeed, Lytton finds the Hymowitz approach sim-
ilar to CERCLA. In both situations, says Lytton, "liability is
grounded on.... an assumption that participation in a particu-
lar practice contributes causally to specific harms."159
CERCLA, however, rests on a different theoretical founda-
tion than Hymowitz. Participation alone suffices under
Hymowitz but not under CERCLA. Whereas a DES manufac-
turer is liable under Hymowitz for selling DES to pregnant wo-
plaintiffs injury. See Smith v. Cutter Biological Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 729 (Haw.
1991); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990); Martin v.
Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Sindell v. Abbott
Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). One could
provide such proof through evidence that the defendant did not market the type
of DES taken by the plaintiff's mother, Conley, 570 So. 2d at 286, or that the
plaintiffs mother took DES pills of a different size or color or from a different
store than that of a particular manufacturer. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1085
(Mollen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The majority in Hymowitz
was concerned that such evidence would allow "a manufacturer with a large
market share to avoid liability in many cases just because it manufactured a
memorably shaped pill." Id. at 1079 n.3. Of course, a "memorably shaped pill"
would be just as likely to implicate a particular manufacturer as it would to
exculpate the manufacturer.
156. 539 N.E.2d at 1078 (footnote omitted).
157. Lytton, supra note 149, at 474.
158. Abrams, supra note 47, at 509.
159. Lytton, supra note 149, at 501 (footnote omitted).
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men, the mere act of selling a hazardous product or generating
hazardous substances does not result in CERCLA liability.
CERCLA requires some connection between the hazardous sub-
stances and a specific site in which hazardous substances have
been disposed. 160 CERCLA also contains three statutory de-
fenses that enable some defendants to escape liability in certain
situations when they can show that they did not cause any of the
harm.161 Whereas Hymowitz requires participation, CERCLA
requires "participation plus."
Hymowitz divorces responsibility from causation by impos-
ing liability depending on the amount of risk a manufacturer
created. Yet if causation has no bearing on responsibility, CER-
CLA as written is underinclusive. In the broadest sense of re-
sponsibility, all consumers who benefit from the activities that
produce hazardous wastes share in the responsibility for that
waste.162 The original funding of Superfund in part by general
tax revenues reflects this theory of responsibility.163 Alterna-
160. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
161. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). Lytton argues that
although the statutory defenses resemble the model of awareness, the defenses
are so narrow that they "will not, in practice, exonerate defendants with an
even minimal level of participation in hazardous waste dumping at the site."
Lytton, supra note 149, at 497. The existence of such defenses, however, is in-
consistent with the model of participation and raises a question about whether
Congress intended CERCLA to embody the model that Lytton describes.
162. To some extent we are all responsible for the past lax practices of
industry and government. That we, through our representatives in
government, tolerated standards and practices that allowed wholesale
dumping of untreated chemicals and other forms of hazardous waste
onto our land, and into our water and air, bespeaks of our lack of fore-
thought as a society. To the extent these cheaper, though harmful
waste disposal practices lowered the prices we paid for consumer prod-
ucts or government services, or created wealth for great numbers of
shareholders of publicly traded companies, the inescapable fact re-
mains that we all benefitted directly from this conduct.
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (D.N.J. 1992). The
Senate committee report specifically disavowed this approach. See S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE -his.
TORY, supra note 2, at 326 ("Taxpayers too often are asked to remedy problems
they do not help create. Relying on general revenues to clean up past industrial
mistakes could be interpreted by some as a public policy precedent, implying
that the longer it takes for problems to appear, the less responsible those who
cause the problem are for the solution."); accord 1 CERCLA LEGISAIvE HIs-
TORY, supra note 2, at 405, 409 (letter from EPA Administrator Douglas M.
Costle).
163. For a general description of the source of the Superfund, see Grad,
supra note 6, at 12; Elizabeth F. Mason, Contribution, Contribution Protection,
and Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCLA: Following Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 73, 79 n.34 (1991); see also United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1500 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that sources of Superfund mon-
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tively, to the extent that certain activities are inherently more
likely to cause hazardous substances contamination, those en-
gaging in such activities should be responsible for those sub-
stances. The part of the Superfund's original funding scheme
that included taxes on the industries most frequently involved
with hazardous substances follows this theory of responsibil-
ity. 6 4  By contrast, CERCLA's present responsible parties
scheme purports to impose liability on those who are responsible
for contamination at a particular site, but in practice that
scheme imposes liability on some parties who can prove that
they did not cause the contamination. Further, those who en-
gaged in the same activities elsewhere and those who benefited
from those activities are excused from liability.
Thus, CERCLA's liability scheme does not resemble
Hymowitz, nor should it. Hymowitz could look at participation
alone because it involved one product used for one purpose.
Rarely can one say the same about a CERCLA site. 165 By as-
serting that a party should be liable even if it had no connection
to the substances which required the cleanup,166 the Hymowitz
approach could require, for example, a generator whose asbestos
was disposed on the plaintiffs property to pay for the cleanup of
an entirely unrelated dioxin problem at that site. Faced with
ies include general revenue appropriations, environmental taxes, costs recov-
ered from responsible parties, and penalties and punitive damages), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
164. See 1 CERCLA LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 63 (testimony of
EPA Assistant Administrator Thomas C. Jorling) ("The fee system [in the Sen-
ate bill] is based upon the belief that the fee should come, to the extent possible,
from those segments of industry and consumers most responsible for imposing
risks upon society."); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1252 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (finding "a clear legislative intent to impose on the chemi-
cal industry financial responsibility under that Act"). Others have argued,
though, that the industries selected to be taxed represented only a fraction of
the entities that have contributed to hazardous waste contamination. See Har-
ris, supra note 30, at 962. In any event, Congress expected the cost to be passed
on to the ultimate consumers. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1980) (noting that a fee on feedstocks can be passed on to consumers), re-
printed in 1 CERCLA LEGIsLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 2, at 327; id. at 408
(letter from EPA Administrator Douglas Costle) ("Virtually all the costs of the
fee system can be passed through the chain of commerce to the ultimate con-
sumer of the final products made from the chemicals subject to the fee without
significant economic impact.").
165. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
166. Lytton, supra note 149, at 496.
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such results, even the defenders of Hymowitz expect courts to
limit its approach to DES cases.1 67
Yet CERCLA, like Hymowitz, may result in responsibility
even when a party disproves causation. Once again, however,
the principle underlying Hymowitz conflicts with CERCLA. Lia-
bility under Hymowitz is several but not joint. A DES manufac-
turer must pay the portion of damages equal to its proportion of
the market-no less (even if causation could be disproved), and
no more (even if other manufacturers have disappeared). As the
Hymowitz court explained, having "eschewed exculpation to pre-
vent the fortuitous avoidance of liability, and thus, equitably, we
decline to unleash the same forces to increase a defendant's lia-
bility beyond its fair share of responsibility."16 CERCLA, by
contrast, usually imposes joint and several liability. 69 As a re-
sult, not only can CERCLA impose liability on parties who have
little or no causal relationship to a plaintiffs injury, but the joint
and several nature of that liability also can result in a party
with little causal nexus to hazardous wastes being required to
pay a substantial part of the cleanup costs.
The "polluter pays" premise of CERCLA thus requires a
connection between a defendant and the site of hazardous waste
contamination not required by Lytton's model of participation or
Hymowitz. Several parts of the statutory scheme reveal that
Congress wanted to focus the responsibility for the cleanup of
hazardous wastes on the parties that had some causal link to
that contamination. °70 Other parts of CERCLA show that Con-
gress wanted to excuse from responsibility those parties who can
prove that they did not cause the contamination.' 7 ' Thus, the
instances in which a court can deem a party responsible despite
disproving causation, as in Hymowitz, render the CERCLA lan-
guage anomalous and ripe for change.
167. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (N.Y. 1989)
("We stress, however, that the DES situation is a singular case, with manufac-
turers acting in a parallel manner to produce an identical, generically marketed
product, which causes injury many years later, and which has evoked a legisla-
tive response reviving previously barred actions."); see also Twerski, supra note
51, at 875-76 (predicting narrow application of market share theory); Nance,
supra note 154, at 434-35 (advocating limited use of market share theory). The
court in Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989), for example,
refused to impose market share liability on the manufacturers of a diphtheria-
pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine because of the chilling effect that such liability
would have on the development of needed vaccines. Id. at 528-29.
168. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078.
169. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
170. See supra part H.B.
171. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see infra part IH.B.2.
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B. A PROPOSAL TO MAKE CERCLA CONSISTENT WITH A "No
CAUSATION, No RESPONSIBILITY" MODEL
CERCLA has other problems besides the fairness of its lia-
bility scheme, 172 and therefore, perhaps Congress should re-
think the entire statute. 173 This Article has more modest aims.
It accepts the statutory premise that those who are responsible
for hazardous waste contamination should pay the costs of
cleaning up that contamination. 174 It also recognizes the diffi-
culty in establishing causation in hazardous wastes cases.
Rather than requiring proof of causation to impose responsibil-
ity, this Article recommends declining to impose liability if the
defendant can prove that it did not cause the plaintiffs injury.
To meet this end, Congress should amend the CERCLA liability
scheme in three respects. First, the statute should hold owners
or operators liable only if the disposal of hazardous substances
occurred at a site during the party's ownership or operation of
the site. Current owners or operators should not be liable, pro-
vided that they satisfy certain limited conditions, if no causal
connection links activities during the period of their control with
the disposal of hazardous wastes at the site. Second, proof that
a defendant's activities did not cause the plaintiffs injury should
provide an absolute defense to liability. Congress therefore
should replace the three existing causation-based defenses with
one complete defense based on the absence of causation. Third,
the statute specifically should provide that causation is the pri-
mary factor in dividing liability among responsible parties, and
it should offer an early opportunity for such determinations.
172. Others have recommended that the cleanup of hazardous waste sites
should be funded by various taxes instead of by the "responsible parties." See
Superfund Liability Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F.
Chavis, Jr. on Feb. 10, 1994); John J. Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA:
Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 332-44
(1986-87). But see TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET EN-
VIRONMENTALISM 148-49 (1991) (arguing against a tax system). A related propo-
sal would establish an administrative forum to determine responsibility for
cleanup costs to replace the current litigation system. See Mashaw, supra note
30, at 1393-96; Harris, supra note 30, at 948-64. But see Abraham, supra note
147, at 845, 898-906 (defending the traditional tort system supplemented by
expanded insurance).
173. That this Article does not address these issues should not be thought to
suggest that all is well with the rest of the statute. For the EPA's list of criti-
cisms, see supra note 12.
174. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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1. Liability of Current Owners or Operators
CERCLA presently holds current owners and operators re-
sponsible for the costs of cleaning up a site even if all of the haz-
ardous wastes were disposed of at the site prior to their
arrival. 517 Indeed, because a plaintiff easily can identify the
current owner and operator and prove that it is a responsible
party, the current scheme creates the incentive to sue current
owners and operators first, and often as the sole defendant.' 7 6
But the difficulty of proving causation does not justify imposing
liability on current owners and operators when these parties
have not disposed of hazardous substances during their involve-
ment with the site. 177 Past owners and operators, after all, are
not liable if no disposal occurred during their ownership or
operation.178
CERCLA's imposition of liability on all current owners and
operators presents three general problems. It conflicts with the
statutory goal of imposing liability on the parties actually re-
sponsible for the disposal of hazardous substances.' 7 9 It creates
175. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
176. The courts consistently have rejected attempts to require a plaintiff to
join all potentially responsible parties in a suit, reasoning that common law
joint and several liability schemes impose no such requirement. See United
States v. Marisol, 725 F. Supp. 833, 843 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Sol-
vent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1450 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Dicker-
son, 640 F. Supp. 448,450 (D. Md. 1986); see also United States v. Atlas, 797 F.
Supp. 411, 413 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (rejecting mandatory joinder by reasoning
that FED. R. Civ. P. 14 provides for impleader and that defendant may file a
third party claim).
177. Regardless of causation, other common law doctrines have been cited to
support current owner and operator liability. CERCLA's legislative history re-
lies on eases imposing strict liability on the owner of property containing abnor-
mally dangerous conditions. See City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co., 827 F.
Supp. 600, 604 (D. Ariz. 1993); 1 CERCLA LEGISLATivE HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 339-41; 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIvE HIsTORY, supra note 2, at 346-50, 361-62.
See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 78 (describing history and current
status of doctrine). The use of that doctrine suffers from the same three
problems listed infra at notes 179-182 and accompanying text. Alternatively,
the common law imposes liability on property owners for maintaining a nui-
sance. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at §§ 86-91. CERCLA liability, how-
ever, exceeds common law nuisance liability because the common law demands
"some causal connection ... between the nuisance and the landowner beyond
mere ownership of the property on which the nuisance originates." Lyons,
supra note 172, at 297; see also id. at 287-89 (describing how CERCLA liability
exceeds common law nuisance liability of predecessor landowners).
178. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 21 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. March 5, 1994).
179. A broad reading of "disposal" can encompass an owner or operator that
did not introduce hazardous substances to the property. See supra note 92. An
expansive definition of "disposal" could undermine the proposal here, but the
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a substantial chilling effect on property transactions, especially
in urban areas in greatest need of economic revitalization and
where much industrial activity or hazardous waste disposal oc-
curred in the past. 180 Finally, even if a current owner or opera-
tor ultimately succeeds in allocating most of the costs to the
parties who actually caused the hazardous substances contami-
nation, the current owner and operator must assume the trans-
actions costs of bringing those parties into the litigation. 18 The
existing statutory innocent landowner defense falls far short of
remedying any of these problems.'8 2
question of what constitutes a "disposal" also involves scientific issues beyond
the scope of this Article.
180. EPA Administrator Browner has expressed her concern as follows:
[The market value of older industrial sites can be depressed, because
the specter of Superfund liability diminishes the attractiveness of in-
vesting in industrial areas. Many claim that prospective owners who
want to develop property have an economic incentive to use undevel-
oped, or "greenfield," sites to avoid potential Superfund liability,
thereby contributing to suburban sprawl and exacerbating chronic un-
employment often found in inner-city industrial areas.
Browner Statement, supra note 2. For similar concerns, see Senator
Lautenberg, 140 CONG. REC. S1085 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994); Representative
Upton, 139 CoNG. REc. E3041 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993), and NAACP leader Dr.
Benjamin Chavis, Jr., Superfund Liability Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony
of Dr. Chavis on Feb. 10, 1994); see also Robin Paul Malloy, Equity Participa-
tions and Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 15 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 63, 64
(1990) (analyzing "the potentially devastating impact of liability for cleanup
costs" that CERCLA imposes on lenders in real estate development). The cur-
rent system thus raises an environmental justice issue. See 140 CONG. REC.
S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994) ("[S]ince the poor and many minority groups tend
to be concentrated in older urban centers or rural areas where polluted real
estate is usually found, they may bear disproportionately greater health and
environmental risks."). See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environ-
mental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 787 (1992) (examining distributional implications of environmental
protection laws on racial minorities).
181. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. SCA Servs. of Ind., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 526,
531-32 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Browner Statement, supra note 2; Superfund Liability
Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony of Katherine N. Probst on Feb. 10, 1994);
Lynette Boomgaarden & Charles Breer, Surveying the Superfund Settlement
Dilemma, 27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 84, 91 (1992); Lyons, supra note 172, at
312-32.
182. Congress added the innocent landowner defense in 1986. CERCLA
§ 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). EPA Administrator Browner has admit-
ted that "this provision of the law has not functioned effectively." Browner
Statement, supra note 2. As another writer put it, "while it appears to be an
oasis for the innocent purchaser of contaminated property who desperately
needs help in the strict liability desert of CERCLA, it frequently turns out to be
a mirage for those who seek to assert it." L. Jager Smith, Jr., Note, CERCLA's
Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage?, 18 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 155,
157 (1993); see also id. at 160-70 (analyzing cases).
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Accordingly, Congress should amend CERCLA's list of re-
sponsible parties to include only those owners and operators-
present or past-who owned or operated a facility at a time
when hazardous substances were disposed there. Under such
an amendment, current owners and operators would not be lia-
ble if all of the disposals at the site predated their ownership or
operation of the facility. This approach would be more consis-
tent with the principles of causation, it would eliminate the dis-
incentive to purchase industrial property in depressed urban
areas, and it would enable current owners and operators to
avoid costly litigation. The Administration's bill, which incorpo-
rates a similar approach with a number of needed safeguards,
would achieve the same results. 183
Removing current owners and operators from CERCLA lia-
bility is this Article's simplest yet most controversial recommen-
dation. The principle objection results from the appearance that
current owners and operators would receive an undeserved
windfall if they obtained property knowing of its contamination
and paid an accordingly reduced price. But Congress can take
separate measures to discourage sham transactions in which a
party pays a reduced price for contaminated property and then
forces other parties to pay for the cleanup of the contamination.
For example, the Administration bill permits the government to
obtain a lien on the property based on the increase in its fair
183. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Under the Administration
bill, a "bona fide prospective purchaser" escapes liability provided certain condi-
tions are satisfied. The "active disposal" of hazardous substances must occur
prior to acquiring ownership; the new owner must conduct an environmental
audit of the site and must provide all required notices concerning hazardous
substances; the new owner must exercise due care and must cooperate with
necessary response actions (including permitting access to the site); and the
new owner must not be affiliated with any responsible party liable for cleaning
up the site. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 605(i) (1994) (adding 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(39)). For a summary of the provision, see 140 CONG. REc. S1079 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1994). One commentator worries, however, that "[t]he conditions to
be a bona fide prospective purchaser' are sufficiently onerous and time-consum-
ing to limit greatly the number of persons to which it would apply." Steven M.
Jawetz, The Superfund Reform Act of 1994: Success or Failure is Within EPA's
Sole Discretion, 24 Envtl L. Rep. 10161, 10166 (1994). The Administration pro-
posal is also limited to current owners who acquire property after the provision
becomes law, see id.; the principles set forth in this Article support the exten-
sion of similar treatment to all current owners and operators. By contrast,
under the proposed Contaminated Sites Reclamation Act of 1994 introduced by
Representative Upton, current owners and operators would remain presump-
tively liable but the innocent landowner defense would be expanded. See 139
CONG. REC. E3042 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993).
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market value as a result of the cleanup.'8 4 A New Jersey stat-
ute takes another approach by barring the sale of contaminated
industrial property until the cleanup is eliminated.' 85
Further, the current CERCLA liability scheme creates per-
verse incentives of its own. A current owner or operator who did
not know of the contamination when it obtained the property
and thus paid a higher price for the property suffers an unde-
served penalty under the current scheme. And removing cur-
rent owners and operators from CERCLA liability eliminates
the existing incentive to engage in a different kind of sham
transaction. Under the present CERCLA liability scheme, a
property owner is liable regardless of whether disposals oc-
curred during the period of ownership, but the property owner
can escape liability simply by selling its property and thus be-
coming a past owner-who is not liable if no disposal took place
while it was an owner. The amendment proposed by this Article
avoids these results.
2. "No Causation" as a Defense
Congress also should amend CERCLA to allow proof that a
defendant did not cause a plaintiffs injury to operate as a com-
plete defense. CERCLA presently contains three causation-
based defenses that cover limited instances in which a defend-
ant can prove that it did not cause the plaintiffs injury.'8 6 Con-
trary to one court's holding, the statutory defenses do not simply
"shift the burden of the proof of causation to the defendants." 18 7
The defendant must prove each defense by a preponderance of
the evidence, and the acts encompassed by each defense must be
the sole cause of the plaintiffs injury.'88 As a result, the statu-
tory defenses are so narrow that few defendants have been able
to prove one of the defenses.' s 9
184. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(b) (1994) (adding 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(n)). The lien would expire as soon as all response costs are recovered or
as soon as the lien is satisfied. Id.; see also 140 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1994) (explaining Administration proposal).
185. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9 (West 1991). For an overview of New
Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA), see Cooper Dev.
Co. v. First Natl Bank, 762 F. Supp. 1145, 1148-50 (D.N.J. 1991). In 1993, the
New Jersey legislature substantially amended ECRA and renamed it the In-
dustrial Site Recovery Act. 1993 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 139, §§ 1-4 (West).
186. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
187. Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (D.R.I. 1986).
188. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
189. See Ferrey, supra note 88, at 238 ("extremely limited defenses"); James
W. Spertus, Holding Environmental Consultants Liable for Their Negligence: A
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Taking each defense in turn, the "act of God" defense has
received almost no attention from courts or commentators.' 90 In
one case, the court found that the defense did not apply because
heavy rainfall was foreseeable, damage was preventable, and
rain was not the sole cause of the release. 191 The courts have
read the identical act of God defense in the Clean Water Act to
exclude similar natural phenomena.192 The applicability of the
defense as interpreted by the courts is, at best, obviously
limited.
The "act of war" defense proves more intriguing. CERCLA
itself does not define an "act of war." The term "act of war" in
CERCLA is inherently less specific than the related defense in
the Federal Tort Claims Act which applies to "[any claim aris-
ing out of combatant activities of the military... during time of
war."193 It is highly doubtful that any hazardous waste contam-
ination at manufacturing sites in the continental United States
resulted from actual combat. On the other hand, a broad read-
ing of CERCLA's act of war defense might encompass manufac-
turing and other production activities that were necessary to
support the war effort.' 94 The only court interpreting the de-
fense, however, rejected such a broad reading of an "act of
war."195
Proposal for Change, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145, 1152 (1991) ("extremely narrow
defenses"). Congress apparently intended such a limited application. See 1
CERCLA LEGISLATIre HISTORY, supra note 1, at 72 (testimony of EPA Assistant
Administrator Thomas C. Jorling) (the statutory defenses are "very limited").
The same factors typically excuse liability in common law tort litigation, even in
strict liability schemes. See Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Materials &
Servs., Inc., 811 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 79, at 563-64).
190. CERCLA defines an "act of God" as "an unanticipated grave natural
disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresis-
tible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by
the exercise of due care or foresight." CERCLA § 101(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1).
191. United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
192. See Liberian Poplar Transports, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 223,
226 (1992) (finding that discharge of oil during thunderstorms could have been
prevented by monitoring weather reports); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 762, 768 (1984) (finding that soil settlement beneath oil
storage tanks was not an act of God); Sabine Towing & Transp. Co. v. United
States, 666 F.2d 561, 564-65 (Cl. Ct. 1981) (finding that runoff of melted snow
was not an act of God because it did not result in an abnormal flow rate).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
194. For one such argument, see G. Nelson Smith, III, The "Act of War"De-
fense Under CERCLA, FED. FAciLITIs ENVTL. J. 267, Autumn 1991, at 267.
195. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
("[T]he term 'act of war' as used in section 107(b)(2) of CERCLA cannot reason-
ably be construed to cover either the government's wartime contracts to
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The third CERCLA causation defense has been the subject
of much more litigation.196 It exonerates a defendant if the con-
tamination results from the acts of a third party who was not in
a contractual or other relationship with the defendant, provided
the defendant exercised due care and took precautions to guard
against the foreseeable actions of any third party. Many defend-
ants have sought to avail themselves of this defense; few have
succeeded. 197 The requirement that the contamination be
"solely" the result of a third party most often dooms efforts to
invoke this defense because of the defendant's possibly tangen-
tial involvement at the site.198
The existing CERCLA causation defenses identify only cer-
tain instances in which a defendant can prove that its activities
did not cause the plaintiffs injury. No reason exists for limiting
the statutory defenses to these instances. Instead, CERCLA
should contain one defense that encompasses any showing that
the defendant's activities did not cause the plaintiffs injury.
Such a defense may not have a significantly different practical
effect from the existing scheme. Proving that one's acts did not
cause hazardous waste contamination and proving that some-
one, or something, else's acts did cause the contamination often
may amount to the same thing.' 99 Yet no justification exists for
purchase aviation fuel from the oil companies or its regulation of the oil compa-
nies' production of aviation fuel.").
196. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 168-69 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO,
Inc., 735 F. Supp. 358, 363 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States v. Stringfellow,
661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283,
1293 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
573, 581-82 (D. Md. 1986); Stacey A. Kipnis, Comment, The Conflict Between
CERCLA and FIRREA: Environmental Liability of the Resolution Trust Corp.,
39 UCLA L. REV. 439, 456 (1992); Weber, supra note 13, at 1476-78.
197. Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1542 (E.D. Cal.
1992), is a notable recent exception.
198. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 581 (W.D.
Mich. 1991); United States v. Marisol, 725 F. Supp. 833, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1989)
(striking Marisol's defense alleging that a third party was the proximate
cause-not the sole cause-of plaintiffs injury); see also Kipnis, supra note 196,
at 456-57, 463-66 (noting the difficulty in establishing this defense); Weber,
supra note 13, at 1476 (same).
199. One commentator has suggested that "[a]lthough a defendant could
theoretically rebut the presumption of causation by showing that all the chemi-
cals in a release were produced by another generator sharing the disposal site-
thus demonstrating that the release was caused solely by the act of a contractu-
ally unrelated third party-government experts have conceded that it is virtu-
ally impossible to prove such an assertion." Developments, supra note 42, at
1521 (citing United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
("The government's experts have admitted that scientific technique has not ad-
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imposing responsibility on any party who can establish that it
did not cause a plaintiffs injury. Nor should such a defendant
have to expend the transactions costs and wait until the alloca-
tion phase to establish that it has no liability. A comprehensive
"no causation" defense would avoid these results by eliminating
the loopholes in the existing statutory scheme.200
Furthermore, such a defense would provide a significant in-
centive to defendants to develop the technology necessary to
identify particular hazardous substances at a site.201 Although
one may question the utility of a statutory provision that de-
flects a defendant's technical efforts from remedying a problem
to disproving liability, the fruits of such research likely will as-
sist in remedial work as well. The technology that enables a de-
fendant to identify a hazardous substance in order to
demonstrate that it came from someone else might also be the
technology that enables others to identify and remedy the con-
tamination. Indeed, if such techniques for "fingerprinting"
wastes develop, the arguments against excluding proof of causa-
tion from a prima facie case under CERCLA weaken mark-
edly.20 2 Thus, if one could easily and inexpensively ascertain
causation, the day may come when it will be appropriate to con-
sider whether CERCLA should require a plaintiff to prove that a
particular defendant's actions caused the plaintiffs injury.
3. Dividing Liability Among Responsible Parties
Causation already plays an important role, both at the ap-
portionment stage and at the allocation stage, in determining
the appropriate division of liability among responsible par-
vanced to a point that the identity of the generator of a specific quantity of
waste can be stated with certainty.")).
200. No comparable provision exists in the Administration bill. The bill,
however, exempts "de micromis" generators and transporters that contributed a
"truly tiny" volume of wastes to a site. S. 1834, supra note 26, § 403(a) (adding
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(5)); 140 CONG. REC. S1080 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994). But see
Superfund Liability Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony of Harriet James on
Feb. 10, 1994) (criticizing the cutoff amount for determining a "de micromis"
contribution as too low). The Administration bill also facilitates EPA's ability
to settle with "de minimis" parties. See S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., § 408(k)
(1994) (adding 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A); see also 140 CONG. REC. S1080 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1994).
201. CERCLA already has spurred technological developments in the
cleanup of hazardous substances, see Browner Statement, supra note 2, and the
Administration's proposed bill would encourage further growth. See S. 1834,
supra note 26, § 604 (1994) (authorizing the use of the Superfund to pay half of
the costs of innovative cleanup technologies that prove unsuccessful).
202. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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ties.203 Courts determine that role, however, on an ad hoc basis
because the statute itself says little about how to apportion or
allocate liability. For example, different courts have produced
strikingly different results when they balanced mere ownership
of a facility against actual operation of the facility or against
generation of the hazardous substances. 20 4 Equally problem-
atic, lengthy litigation is needed to obtain a final determination
of the relative liability of responsible parties, which delays the
actual cleanup of hazardous substances and results in tremen-
dous transactions costs.
CERCLA should adopt a system by which responsible par-
ties may obtain an early determination that they are liable for
the amount of harm that they caused. Although there is no easy
way to compare the causal contributions of owners to genera-
tors, or transporters to operators,20 5 CERCLA should make the
relative role of each responsible party that caused the injury the
primary factor in dividing liability among defendants.206 The
Gore factors offer a good starting point, and Congress should
add to CERCLA a similar provision with more detailed guidance
aimed at dividing liability among responsible parties according
to the costs attributable to that party.
203. See supra part H.C-D.
204. See supra note 142. Moreover, some courts have said that the Gore
factors, supra note 133, which guide most courts in allocating liability, do not
apply if the defendants fall within different categories of responsible parties.
See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 n.9 (D. Md.
1991) (stating that "the contribution-to-the-harm analysis may not be applica-
ble in apportioning liability among different classes of defendants"); South Flor-
ida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, No. 88-8038-CIV-Davis, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17555, at *6 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 1989) (stating that the Gore factors
apply between operators and generators, not owners and generators).
205. Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 FoRDHAM L. REV. 913
(1992), provides a general analysis of the difficulties of comparing different
causes of injury. For similar discussions in the CERCLA context, see Mason,
supra note 163, at 93-100; Dale Guariglia, Comment, Apportionment and Con-
tribution Under the "Superfund" Act, 53 UMKC L. REv. 594, 615-22 (1985).
206. Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton takes the opposite view, stat-
ing that it is inadvisable "to tie the allocator's hands by mandating factors in
the statute." Superfund Liability Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony of Gale
Norton on Feb. 10, 1994). Similarly, the Environmental Defense Fund believes
that any allocation of liability among responsible parties at Superfund sites
"can only be a rough exercise in equity." Id. (testimony of William J. Roberts,
representing the Environmental Defense Fund). As discussed above, this Arti-
cle maintains that causation should play the central role in determining re-
sponsibility for cleanup costs, and the difficulty in achieving that end should
not dissuade Congress from providing such direction. Further, allocation of lia-
bility to those defendants who did not cause the harm at issue does not qualify
as even "rough" justice.
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Both the Administration bill and Representative Boucher's
bill address these issues. Both bills would adopt the Gore fac-
tors.20 7 The bills differ, however, in their approach to expediting
the determination of each defendant's liability. The Administra-
tion bill proposes a nonbinding allocation scheme in which the
EPA first identifies potentially responsible parties. A neutral
"allocator" selected by the parties or by the EPA then considers
the evidence in light of the Gore factors and issues a proposed
allocation of liability among the parties. Finally each party
chooses whether or not to settle on that basis, provided the EPA
accepts the allocator's report.208 Thus, instead of being jointly
and severally liable for the entire cost of cleaning up a site, a
responsible party who agreed to the allocation scheme would be
held liable only for the cleanup costs that it caused.20 9 If, how-
ever, a party decides not to settle based on the amount deter-
mined by the allocator, it will be jointly and severally liable for
all response costs that remain.210 The specter of joint and sev-
eral liability gives this voluntary allocation scheme an attractive
carrot and a powerful stick. The corollary is that some of the
costs of the cleanup would go unrecovered from the responsible
parties. The Administration bill would rely on the Superfund-
and thus, the taxpayers-to pay for cleanups when the responsi-
ble parties cannot be located or are unable to pay for the
cleanup. 21 ' The bill would place a $300 million annual limit on
207. See S. 1834, supra note 26, § 409 (adding CERCLA § 122a(d)(3)); 139
CONG. REC. E3118 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993) (describing the Boucher bill). The
Administration bill also would empower the EPA to add other factors by regula-
tion, S. 1834, supra note 26, § 409; the Boucher bill permits consideration of any
other appropriate equitable factor. 139 CONG. REC. E3118, supra.
208. S. 1834, supra note 26, § 409 (adding CERCLA § 122a(c)-(d)). For a
description of the allocation process, see 140 CONG. lEc. S1081-82 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1994).
209. A somewhat similar alternative would amend CERCLA to emphasize
that the imposition ofjoint and several liability is discretionary, not mandatory.
A few renegade courts, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984), have already read CERCLA in this fashion, and
other writers have endorsed this approach. See Rockwood & Harrison, supra
note 14, at 10,544; Noone, supra note 14, at 312-13, 322-23. By contrast, the
Fifth Circuit in In Re Bell Petroleum analyzed but ultimately rejected theA & F
Materials approach, 3 F.3d 889, 899-902 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1993).
210. S. 1834, supra note 26, § 409 (adding CERCLA § 122a(i)(1)).
211. The alternative in cases involving private party plaintiffs would be to
deny recovery of the full amount of the cleanup costs, a result contrary to the
goals of many in Congress. See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 2, at 13, reprinted in
1 CERCLA LEGIsLATIvE HIsToRY, supra note 2, at 320 ("To establish provisions
of liability any less than strict, joint, and several liability would be to condone a
system in which innocent victims bear the actual burden of releases, while
those who conduct commerce in hazardous substances which cause such dam-
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the Superfund's total payment of the costs of such "orphan
shares." 2 12
Although this approach would be a substantial improve-
ment over the current scheme, several limitations threaten its
utility. The allocation procedure only applies to sites listed on
the National Priorities List (NPL), the worst hazardous waste
sites in the country.213 All other sites would remain subject to
the existing confusion and complaints. Further, the orphan
shares are likely to exceed $300 million, so the funds must come
from elsewhere or this approach will not clean up even the NPL
sites. 214 The EPA's ability to veto an allocator's conclusions cre-
ates another potential for collapse. Finally, many have ques-
tioned the efficacy of a nonbinding allocation scheme in reducing
transactions costs, in providing certainty, and in accelerating ac-
tual cleanup work.2 15
The Boucher bill, by contrast, would establish a binding al-
location scheme. A panel of administrative law judges would de-
termine the allocation, and the results would bind the parties
under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard.216 As a result,
the costs of making the allocation determination probably would
increase with the creation of a new bureaucratic system, but all
parties would gain increased certainty knowing that everyone
else will have to live with the results.
The success of either scheme depends on the incentives it
provides to participants. 217 That, in turn, largely depends on
the fairness-or even the perceived fairness-of the mediators
age benefit with relative impunity."); see also id. at 33-34, reprinted in 1 CER-
CLA LEGISLATirE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 340-41 (advocating strict liability
for hazardous activities).
212. S. 1834, supra note 26, § 409 (1994) (adding CERCLA § 122a(e)).
213. Id. (adding CERCLA § 122a(a)(1)).
214. See Superfund Liability Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony of Dennis
Minano, representing the American Automobile Manufacturers Association, on
Feb. 10, 1994); id. (testimony of Bernard J. Reilly, representing the Chemical
Manufacturers Association, on Feb. 10, 1994). But see id. (testimony of William
J. Roberts, representing the Environmental Defense Fund, on Feb. 10, 1994)
(asserting that the Superfund should not pay more of the orphan shares).
215. Organizations as divergent as the Environmental Defense Fund, id.
(testimony of William J. Roberts, representing the Environmental Defense
Fund, on Feb. 10, 1994), and the Chemical Manufacturers Association, id. (tes-
timony of Bernard J. Reilly, representing the Chemical Manufacturers Associa-
tion), have expressed serious concerns about a nonbinding allocation scheme.
See id.
216. See 139 CONG. REC. E3119-20 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993).
217. See 140 CONG. REC. S1059 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Baucus).
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who determine the relative liability of the responsible parties.
To the extent that such determinations appear ad hoc or based
on inappropriate factors, the process will suffer. For this reason,
the factors used to determine the proper allocation of liability
play a crucial role. With such factors, responsible parties will
better predict their liability and allocators more readily will de-
termine liability. If the role of a responsible party operates as
the principle factor in determining relative liability, then Con-
gress will realize CERCLA's goal of making "polluters pay."
CONCLUSION
The role causation plays in CERCLA's responsible party
scheme has frustrated courts interpreting the statute. The Al-
can decisions serve as only the most recent indication that the
courts fear the statute can produce inequitable results. Yet the
difficulty in proving causation supports a system in which the
plaintiff need not identify exactly who caused the hazardous
substances contamination before recovering its damages. The
solution proposed in this Article, while not placing plaintiffs in
the difficult position of showing who caused the harm, frees de-
fendants who can establish that they did not cause the environ-
mental harm.
The recommended amendments to CERCLA all follow from
this basic principle. They are thus preferable to many of the
proposed statutory fixes now sought by groups of aggrieved de-
fendants. Banks,2 18 municipalities, 219 mining companies, 220 en-
vironmental consultants, 221 federal agencies, 222 and other
groups2 23 each have sought special protection from CERCLA's
liability scheme. Each group argues that it does not have re-
sponsibility for environmental contamination. For each group
that succeeds in rewriting CERCLA to escape liability, the pres-
sure increases on the disfavored groups that remain within the
statute's coverage.
CERCLA needs fixing. Congress now has the opportunity to
respond to the statute's critics and to rewrite the problematic
parts of the statutory scheme. The amendments proposed in
218. 140 CONG. lEc. S1080 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1994).
219. Id.
220. See American Steel Institute v. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
221. Spertus, supra note 189, at 1147, 1164.
222. 140 CONG. REc., supra note 218, at S1081.
223. Id. at S1058-81.
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this Article focus on the areas in which CERCLA departs from
common law causation principles. The amendments will not
completely remedy CERCLA's ills, but they should assure a co-
herent relationship between CERCLA, causation, and
responsibility.
